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International protections of human rights have increased
dramatically in the last century,' due in part to the increased recogni-
tion that a number of nations share many fundamental legal values and
expectations.2 One crucial commonality is the acknowledgement that
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University; President, International Association of Penal Law; President, International Institute
of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences; Member, United Nations Commission of Experts,
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. The views presented in this article do
not represent those of the Commission or the United Nations.
1. For example, the United Nations has implemented a number of instruments protecting
human rights. See HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPmATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev. 3, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV.1 passim (1988); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC TEXTISpassim (1985); BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (Ian Brownlie ed., 2d ed. 1980).
2. See generally JACK DONNELLY & RHODA E. HOWARD, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4-6 (1987) (asserting the universality of human rights); MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 6 (1980) (noting that the
world public order can tolerate differences as long as they are "accomodated in terms of common
interest"); A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 1 (1989) (noting
increased international concern about the protection of human rights); Karen Parker & Lyn B.
Neylonjus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
411, 414-16 (1989) (explanation of jus cogens, which are generally recognized peremptory norms,
as the basis for international human rights); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1-17 (1982)
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individuals must be protected from certain depredations against their
person, and that international laws are needed to protect people from
policies which ultimately affect the global community.3  The present
discussion will focus on the protections afforded persons in the context
of the administration of criminal justice. These safeguards are
important protections against abuses of power which affect the life,
liberty, and physical integrity of individuals.4  Without these
protections and limitations on the potential abusive exercise of power
by states, democracy could not exist. Thus, there is an inseparable link
between the protection of individual and collective human rights and
democracy. The field of battle in which democracy and human rights
are tested is the administration of criminal justice, which encompasses
all processes and practices by which a state affects, curtails, or removes
basic rights.'
There are no current conceptual frameworks for developing and
enforcing internationally recognized human rights. 6 Indeed, there are
(historical overview of the rise in human rights awareness and enforcement since World War II).
But see Etienne-Richard Mbaya, The Compatibility of Regional Human Rights Systems with
International Standards, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECrIE 66 (Asbjern Eide & Bernt Hagtvet
eds., 1992) (arguing that there has been a decrease in the recognition and observance of human
rights around the world).
3. See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
204-05 (1989); Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict" International Humanitarian
Law, reprinted in 2 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 356-57 (1984);
Imre Szabo, Historical Foundations of Human Rights and Subsequent Developments, in
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11, 21 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982); see generally
HUMANrFARiAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNIfED NATIONS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973)
(discussing humanitarian intervention as the imposition of international human rights standards
by one nation on the citizens of another).
4. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. See, e.g., Haji N.A. Noor Muhammad, Due
Process of Law for Persons Accused of Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 138, 140 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (protection
against arbitrary arrest forms the central feature of any system of guarantees of the liberty of the
individual).
5. It should be noted that the state's policies and practices are conducted and carried out
by individuals. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 235-47 (1992) (discussing the imputability of individual action
to the state).
6. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 13 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984) (international
human rights laws are most effective if each nation makes these rules part of its own domestic
legal system); Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1, 15-16 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (international
instruments require and induce states to protect human rights and do not operate directly to grant
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no formal rankings or classifications of rights for purposes of enforce-
ment.7 Because of the absence of these rankings and classifications,
recognition of international norms and standards has emerged and
developed, gaining increased adherence throughout the world
irrespective of the legally binding nature of the norms.' Some of
these rights may be systemized into a series of stages through which
they pass in gaining universal recognition.' This system of classifica-
tion does not purport to be a rigid theory, but merely an observation
based on empirical analysis.'0  The different stages reflect the
evolution of the rights from their beginnings in the intellectual ferment
of various elite circles to their formulation in international instruments
of varying types, culminating in their enforcement through internation-
al criminalization. Although only some rights will pass through all of
these stages of evolution, the evidence seems to support the existence
of a process that can be viewed as a general method of analyzing the
life of human rights norms and instruments." Social values shape the
articulation of legal principles which eventually find their way into
general or specific civil prescriptions, and are finally embodied in penal
proscriptions. 2
Most human rights take a similar path to international recognition.
At first the rights are enunciated in nonbinding international instru-
ments. 3 Next the rights are more specifically defined in international
instruments which have some legally binding effect. 4 These rights
are then included in a specialized international instrument, and lastly
they are the object of a binding international instrument which
criminalizes violations of that right and provides for some enforcement
individual rights); see also Karel Vasak, The Distinguishing Criteria of Institutions, in 1 THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 215, 218 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982) (five
functions of human rights institutions are information, investigation, conciliation, decision, and
sanction).
7. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 63-66; Bilder, supra note 6, at 16 (questioning
whether so many diverse states can agree to the content of any rights and enforce them).
8. See ROBERTSON & MERRILIS, supra note 2, at 27 (the Universal Declaration has been
quoted or reproduced in at least forty constitutions and regional human rights treaties of the
Americas, Africa, and Europe); Henkin, supra note 6, at 1 (the Universal Declaration has been
adopted by most of the world's countries).
9. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
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of that right. 5 At present, some protections for the individual within
the criminal process have risen to the level of "general principles" of
international law,'6 while other protections have been incorporated
into international instruments which criminalize the violations of the
protected right. 7
The present discussion will analyze the level of international
protections given to a person within the criminal process with respect
to various types of rights which have been delineated in Appendix
1.8 The methodology used in this study is empirically-based and
rather straightforward. It has grown out of the recognition that
traditional sovereignty-based arguments against the recognition or
application of internationally protected human rights are no longer
valid because of the vast array of applicable treaties, the customary
practices of states, and the legally binding nature of general principles
of international law which, in this context, represent the convergence
of treaties, customs, national legislation, 9 and jus cogens. ° There-
fore, international human rights law can penetrate into areas that in
the past have been deemed to be wholly within the realm of domestic
law.2' Part II will review issues concerning national sovereignty and
its relation to international legal norms. The discussion will lay the
foundation for the determination of whether a certain right is
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel Derby, The Crime of Torture, in 1 INTERNATION-
AL CRIMINAL LAW 363, 379-82 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
17. Bassiouni, supra note 9, at 195; see generally Muhammad, supra note 4, at 139 (regarding
the binding and nonbinding nature of the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR). For example,
the Universal Declaration contains many nonbinding principles that nations "should" observe as
well as other rights which have become binding through their incorporation into national
consitutions. See ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 2, at 27.
18. Those rights include the right to life, liberty, and security of the person; the right to
recognition before the law and equal protection of the law; the right to be free from arbitrary
arrest and detention; the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment or punishment; the right to be presumed innocent; the right to a fair trial and
corresponding subrights; the right to assistance of counsel and corresponding subrights; the right
to a speedy trial; the right to appeal; the right to be protected from double jeopardy; and the right
to be protected from ex post facto laws. Appendix II, infra.
19. See ROBERTSON & MERRILlS, supra note 2, at 27 (discussing the almost complete
international acceptance of the Universal Declaration); Henkin, supra note 6, at 1-2; BIN CHENO,
GENERAL. PRLNCIPLEs OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
(1953); M. Cherif Bassiouni, A FunctionalApproach to "General Principles of International Law,"
11 MICH. . INT'L L. 768 (1990).
20. See Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to
International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (1988).
21. See Henkin, supra note 6, at 2.
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sufficiently universal to rise to the level of an internationally recog-
nized general principle.
This study uses an inductive method of inquiry in Part III to
identify internationally protected human rights and the existence of
their counterparts in national constitutions. Both international
instruments" and domestic constitutions' provide the data for
comparison. Part IV sets out the instruments used in the study and
how they are applied in the inductive method of comparative research.
The rights found in the instruments evidence their international
recognition, while their counterparts in the national constitutions
evidence national legal recognition. The congruence of both indicate
the existence of a "general principle." Clearly, international instru-
ments and national constitutions do not use identical language and
drafting styles, if for no other reason than the fact that national
constitutions reflect different legal systems and drafting approaches as
well as different cultures and languages. Precisely because there are
so many reasons to warrant linguistic and theoretical diversity,
however, the existence of strong similarities is more convincing
evidence that these rights are contained in "general principles" of law.
It should be added that the practices of states in applying these
commonly recognized fights vary significantly. This study uses a
purely empirical model of searching for repetition and similarity
among the various rights to prove that similar rights evidence the
22. Ten international conventions have been surveyed for the current discussion:
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doe. A/RES/39/46 (1984) [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Convention on
Racial Discrimination]; ICCPR, supra note 4, at 52; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [and Accompanying Protocols], Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Fundamental Freedoms]; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 297, U.N. Doc. A/43/173 (1988) [hereinafter BOP]; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, at
71; United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners at 67, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/6/1, Annex I, A, U.N. Sales No. 1956.IV.4 (1956) [hereinafter SMRTP]; European
Convention on the Protection of Detainees from Torture and from Crue Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, signed Nov. 26,1987, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152 [hereinafter European
Convention on Protection of Detainees]; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted
June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)
[hereinafter Banjul];American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series
No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. A/16 [hereinafter AMCHR]. These instruments are also
listed in Appendix I, infra.
23. See Appendix III infra for a list of the constitutions and countries used in the current
survey.
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existence of principles common to international law and national law,
and that they are binding "general principles of law."
The first step in identifying to what extent a right is protected
under international law is deciding whether it exists as an international,
or as a merely national, right. Once a right may be addressed on an
international level, it remains to be seen whether it is similarly
addressed in that manner on the national level.
II. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW NORMS
Historically, the notion of sovereignty has been a bar to the
application of international substantive legal norms to national criminal
justice processes.24 Procedural international norms have had even
less success penetrating national procedures.' Over the course of
time, however, the increasing influence of international regulation of
armed conflicts and the development of international criminal law have
broken through national sovereignty barriers. Subsequently, interna-
tional legal principles, norms, and standards of human rights
protections have been increasingly applied to national criminal justice
processes, resulting in a higher level of international law penetration
into the national legal context.
The erosion of the sovereignty barrier effectively began after
World War II. This process developed along two paths. The first
involved the development of international criminal law, particularly
international humanitarian law,26 and the second through the develop-
ment of international human rights law.
A. The Effect of International Criminal Law
Under international criminal law, individuals are subject to
criminal responsibility for international crimes irrespective of national
24. This is true for human rights norms as well as international criminal law norms. See
Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Criminal
Law, 31 HARV. INT'L LU. 37, 40 (1990) (recognizing sovereignty as the fundamental problem
confronting international criminal law enforcement).
25. See Sohn, supra note 2, at 8-9 (restrictive interpretations of the United Nations Charter,
particularly Articles 2-4, prevent interference in the domestic affairs of another state).
26. See Denise Bindschedler-Robert, Problems of the Law of Armed Conflicts, in 1 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 297-98 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda
eds., 1973).
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law.27 For some of these crimes, the prohibited activity is clearly
linked to an internationally regulated activity such as war. In these
instances, international criminal law includes international humani-
tarian law, which is part of the international law of war. Sometimes
there does not need to be an international element present to
constitute an international crime, such as in cases where conduct is
inherently shocking to fundamental values of humanity. For example,
apartheid and torture were once considered purely domestic matters.
However, the international community has prohibited them even
though neither impacts the peace and security of humanity in the
traditional sense. The traditional test under the United Nations' Draft
Code of Offences looked to an action's impact on peace and security
as a guideline for whether to designate it an international crime or
whether to allow it to remain wholly within the domestic jurisdiction
of a given state.
B. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
International human rights law, which has traditionally been
referred to as the international law of peace, has also influenced the
erosion of national sovereignty with respect to practices within the
context of the administration of criminal justice. There are a number
27. CHEN, supra note 3, at 78 (discussing the Nuremberg Trials, where individuals were held
responsible for violations of international law carried out on behalf of their country and
legitimized by national laws).
28. See Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 9, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 123 (1954); Leo
Gross, Some Observations on the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, 15 ISR. Y.B. HUM. Ris. 224 (1985); Sharon Williams, The Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 16,
at 109; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tnx. L. REV. 785,
829 (1988); Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International Criminal
Court, 1991 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135, 140 (1991). Torture constitutes an interesting
example of the evolution of international norms. Several international and regional conventions
provide substantive as well as procedural norms directly applicable to national criminal justice
in the area of torture. See ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 7, 9-11, 14-15, at 53-55; Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 22, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-230, arts. 5-7; AMCHR, supra note 22, art. 8, at 4.
These instruments not only prohibit torture, but also preclude the admissibility of evidence
produced by torture in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., AMCHR, supra note 22, arts. 5(2), 8(3),
at 2,4. The Convention Against Torture, supra note 22, at 197, art. 2, prevents torture under any
circumstances and requires positive action by states to prohibit torture; when combined with the
actions of the United Nations Committee against Torture, it provides the best and most far-
reaching example of penetration of international law into national criminal justice processes. See
J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE (1988).
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of instruments which identify certain rights but which differ as to their
binding legal effect. They must therefore be considered individually
as well as cumulatively to determine whether there is an obligation by
a state to conform to the requirements of those rights. A binding legal
norm may take one of three forms: a given convention or treaty; a
general or particular international custom (as evidenced by consistent
practice and opino juris); and a general principle of law (as evidenced
by other perfected and unperfected sources of international law or by
principles derived from the major legal systems of the world).29
All too frequently, human rights advocates overlook these
important legal distinctions and attempt the de jure condendo
extrapolation of legal rights or binding obligations from international
instruments which do not have legally binding effects.3" In fact,
human rights advocates frequently cross into the realm of lex desirata
with the argument that the moral and ethical merits of a given
proposition are sufficient to overcome technical legal arguments.3'
Jurists, however, must rely on appropriate legal techniques to
effectively advocate human rights in all legal contexts, whether the
jurists are working at the international, regional, or national level.
One such technique is the attempt to identify as "general principles"
of international law those human rights protections applicable to the
criminal process which are articulated in the major international
human rights instruments. The initial step in this process, the
identification of these rights in the national constitutions of the world,
constitutes Part V of this Article.
A historical distinction that is now eroding separates international
human rights law from international humanitarian law.32 While
human rights law is known as the law of peace, international humani-
29. See LouIs HENKiN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (2d ed.
1987).
30. See generally ALLISON D. RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM
VERSUS RELATIVISM 39-60 (1990) (arguing that the legitimacy of human rights derives from
moral authority).
31. See generally id. (discussing the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of human
rights; arguing for a broader conceptual basis, and challenging the idea that Western notions of
human rights are universal).
32. Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws,
31 AM. U. L. REV. 935, 935 (1982). The International Committee of the Red Cross coined the
phrase "international humanitarian law" in the 1950s to refer to the Geneva Conventions,
previously considered part of the law of war. Id.; see also ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note
2, at 263 (discussing the development of international humanitarian law through the Red Cross:
caring for the wounded on the battlefield, and the care and exchange of those held as prisoners
of war).
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tarian law has developed as part of the international regulation of
armed conflict, otherwise referred to as the law of war.33 Somehow
these distinctions have not been totally eliminated, and thus interna-
tional humanitarian law applies only in the context of armed conflicts,
whether of an international or noninternational character.'
III. DETERMINING GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
35
The inductive method is the technique by which "general
principles of international law" are extracted from domestic legal
principles or norms discovered in the major legal systems of the
world.36 This approach is the most appropriate means of comparative
law research and must be particularized with respect to each subject
or specific inquiry. 7 Thus, if the principle which is being researched
is one of great generality, it is usually easier to identify its existence in
the various national legal systems. If, however, the principle being
investigated is narrow or specific, then the research must be equally
narrow and should focus on the more relevant or particularized sources
of law within the various national legal systems.
The research methodology used to identify "general principles"
can be analogized to the methods used in establishing international
law. Thus, one author notes that "a law which is frequently applied
carries greater weight than a law which is never or seldom applied; any
kind of State practice carries greater weight if it involves an element
of repetition., 31 It can be concluded, therefore, that the more a given
principle appears in national legislation and in international instru-
ments, the more it deserves deference.39 Similarly, the existence of
the same legal prohibition in a number of legal systems evidences the
33. Schindler, supra note 32, at 35.
34. Although this subject is of significant interest, it is beyond the scope of the current
discussion and therefore will not be addressed.
35. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 768.
36. On the methodology of research to ascertain "general principles" see Rudolph
Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 51 AM.
J. INT'L L. 134 (1957); CHENG, supra note 19, at 1. On the history and development of the
relationship between international and national law, see HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927).
37. Schlesinger, supra note 36, at 134.
38. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
9 (1974-75).
39. See Samuel A. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly
Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 444,454 (1969).
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existence of the principle which embodies the social interest sought to
be protected and whose transgression is sanctioned in the prohibition.
There are, however, obvious differences between national and
international legal systems. National legal systems may have similar
traits or share a common historical background.' A survey of the
world's major legal systems reveals that they may be grouped in five
major families of national legal systems.41  They are: the French
Romanist-Civilist, the Germanic, the Common Law, the Marxist-
Socialist, and the Islamic.42 It should be stated that such a classifica-
tion is overly general and that many contemporary systems are a
hybrid of more than one of these systems. Each legal family shares at
least certain fundamental conceptual similarities which distinguish it
from other systems.43 This research focuses on all national legal
systems which have a written constitution irrespective of their inclusion
in any one of the major families of legal systems. In addition, this
research focuses on a select number of major international instruments
and compares the provisions of the latter with their counterpart, if they
exist, in national constitutions.
40. See RENA DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRrERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 19 (1978); Shmuel N.
Eisenstadt, Human Rights in Comparative Civilizational Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
PERSPECIVE, supra note 2, at 93-105.
41. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 40, at 21-29. The three primary families are the
Romano-Germanic, the Common Law, and the Socialist families. lI& at 21. In addition, there
is a Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish legal family, a Far Eastern legal family, and a Black African and
Malagasy Republican legal family. Id. at 27-29.
42. With the dramatic legal'reforms undertaken recently in the former Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, and other Marxist states, the Marxist-Socialist family of legal systems has been
radically altered. As to whether it ever did constitute a genuinely different legal family, see John
Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 781,781-808 (1989). For
information on the reform of Socialist law, see generally Rett R. Ludwikowski, Searching for a
New Constitutional Model for East-Central Europe, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 91 (1991)
(considering Polish, Soviet, and other Soviet Bloc constitutional traditions and suggesting the form
new constitutions might take in the successor states); Inga Markovits, Last Days, 80 CAL L. REV.
55 (1992) (exploring the change from socialist to capitalist legal systems as Germany reunifies and
its impact on individual judges, prosecutors, and parties as revealed through interviews and
observations).
43. See DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 40, at 19 (comparativists do not look to particular
laws but to general characteristics in classifying laws into legal families). Each of the three major
legal families have different identifying characteristics. The Romano-Germanic family was
initially based on rules of conduct which were linked to justice and morality, with an emphasis
on legal doctrine. Id. at 21. The Common Law family was influenced by judge-made laws
created as solutions to individual trials. Id. at 23. In addition, where the Romano-Germanic
traditions developed as private law, the common law developed as public law. Id. at 21, 23. The
Socialist family was originally based on Romano-Germanic legal systems but acquired an
emphasis on revolution and the creation of a new social and economic order. Id. at 25.
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This inductive research methodology is widely recognized and
relied upon in connection with the identification of customary
international law' and "general principles of international law as
recognized by civilized nations."'4 The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ)4 used this inductive approach as early as 1927
in the Lotus case.47 In that case both Turkey and France relied on
this comparative law procedure to argue their points. In particular,
Tlirkey brought together procedural and jurisdictional practices of
France and Italy to create a principle of jurisdiction.'
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), like its predecessor the
PCIJ, also examines national legal systems to derive the existence of
a custom or "general principle." Two significant cases use identical
methods of empirical research. In the Nottebohm case 49 the ICJ
examined national legal provisions on nationality law, and in the North
Sea Continental Shelf ° case the Court looked for relevant national
laws on exploration of continental shelves." Governments have also
recognized and used the inductive method to ascertain the existence
of customary international law 2 For example, the British Foreign
Office recognized the validity of this approach, particularly with
respect to criminal matters, as early as 1877.'3 The Office instructed
the British Minister in Rio de Janeiro that "Her Majesty's Government
44. See, eg., ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971) (arguing that customary law is the objective manifestation of international consensus);
Akehurst, supra note 38, at 1-53 (analyzing and summarizing the elements necessary for forming
customary international law).
45. Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26,1945, art. 38,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]; see CHENG, supra note 19, at 1; Bassiouni,
supra note 19, at 773.
46. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was approved by the League of
Nations in 1920, established in 1921, and opened in 1922. See Francis A. Boyle, American
Foreign Policy Toward International Law and Organizations: 1898-1970, 6 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. LJ. 185, 233-39 (1983). The PCIJ was the predecessor to the International Court of
Justice, which came into being April 18,1946. See NAGENDRA SUIGLE, THE ROLE AND RECORD
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 10-12 (1989).
47. See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 21 (Sept. 7) ("[B]efore
ascertaining whether there may be a rule of international law expressly allowing Turkey to
prosecute a foreigner for an offence committed by him outside Turkey, it is necessary to begin
by establishing... that the system is well founded....").
48. See id. at 8-9 (reproducing an abridged version of the Turkish government's arguments).
49. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.CJ. 4, 21-24 (Apr. 6).
50. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 4
(Feb. 20).
51. Id. at 128-30, 174-76, 225-29.
52. See Akehurst, supra note 38, at 8-10 (discussing national laws and judgments).
53. See iL at 8.
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... would not be justified in protesting against a law extending the
jurisdiction of Brazilian criminal courts because the law was similar to
the laws of several other countries."'54 Here, the similarities of
various national laws provided a basis for international action.
The United States has also used the inductive method in its
diplomatic relations since the late nineteenth century.5 The Cutting
incident between the United States and Mexico is indicative of this
point. 6 Although the United States and Mexico both relied on the
laws of different countries to establish the existence of a principle or
custom, the case should be noted for the emphasis each country placed
on the number of representative countries whose laws supported each
side of the dispute. 7
National courts resort to this method as well. Courts in both the
United States58 and Italy,59 for example, have relied on the inductive
reasoning in reaching decisions.
A. Application of the Inductive Method
The inductive method is most easily understood through its
judicial application. This method is often used in extradition cases,
particularly those involving the issue of dual criminality, which may
54. 2 ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 153 (1956) (giving the
opinion of the British government on the application of Brazilian law to British subjects).
55. See Letter from Mr. Connery to Mr. Bayard (Nov. 16,1887), enclosing Letter from Mr.
Connery to Mr. Mariscal (Nov. 15,1887), in 1887 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
844, 849 (1888) ("[M]y Government considers that the arrest, imprisonment, trial, and sentence
of Cutting, as well as the denial to him of the sanctions of justice recognized by all civilized
countries were violative of the rules of international law, binding upon Mexico in spite of any
domestic enactments conflicting therewith....").
56. See Letter from Mr. Bayard to Mr. Connery (Nov. 1, 1887), id. at 751-52 ("[B]y the law
of nations, no punishment can be inflicted by a sovereign on citizens of other countries 'unless
in conformity with those sanctions of justice which all civilized nations hold in common."').
57. See id. at 753-55,781-817 (surveying the legislation of various countries in regard to the
provision for punishment of their own citizens for acts committed by citizens outside of their
national borders); see also id. at 761-64 (translation of Mexican court proceedings in Cutting).
58. See eg., The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677,708 (1900) ("This review of the precedents
and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present day,
by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world ... it is an established rule of
international law.. .. "); The Scotia, 14 Wallace 170,187 (1871) ("Like all the laws of nations, [the
law of the sea] rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not
because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally accepted as
a rule of conduct.").
59. Lagos v. Baggianini, 22 I.L.R. 533, 534-38 (Tribunal of Rome 1953) (examining the
custom and practice of states in determining the "generally accepted rules" regarding diplomaticimmunity).
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thus serve as a good example of the inductive approach.' ° The
principle of double or dual criminality requires that a state which has
received an extradition request determine whether the crime for which
the person was accused also constitutes a crime under its domestic
laws. There are two methods of inquiry: in concreto and in
abstracto.6' The in concreto approach, which has been rarely used
since the late nineteenth century, inquires into the elements of the
crime in the laws of the requested state to ascertain whether they are
substantially similar to the elements of the crime in the laws of the
requesting state. The inquiry thus entails a high level of specificity
with respect to the terminology and required elements of the crime in
question. The in abstracto approach, which is the more widely used
method, inquires into the underlying facts of the criminal charge in the
requesting state in order to ascertain whether they would give rise to
the same or similar charge in the requested state.62
The principle of dual criminality reflects the modem trend in
comparative criminal research which is applied in this study. That is,
the identification of principles of criminal justice procedures is done by
identifying and then comparing basic criminal procedure rights in
various national legal systems in order to determine the existence of
"general principles" common to the major legal systems of the world.
60. SeeM. CHERIFBASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE
(2d rev. ed. 1987).
61. See generally 39 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr PtNAL 371-784 (1968) (dedicated
to national reports on extradition from Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Finland,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States, and Yugoslavia).
62. This is a necessary requirement for European cooperation in penal matters. See 1
EKKEHART MOLLER-RAPPARD & M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-
OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATrERS: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (2d rev.
ed. 1992). For different modalities of international cooperation in penal matters, see Heinrich
Griltzner, International JudicialAssistance and Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in 2 A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 189-249 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973); Ekkehart
Mtller-Rappard, The European System, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW. PROCEDURE 95-132
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). For a survey of recent mutual legal assistance treaties between
the United States and other countries, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, Negotiations in Criminal Law
Assistance Treaties, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 467-504 (1985); Bruce Zagaris & David Simonetti, Judicial
Assistance Under U.S. Bilateral Treaties, in 2 LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 219-30 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987). For a socialist perspective,
see D. Krapa6, An Outline of the Recent Development of the Yugoslav Law of International
Judicial Assistance and Co-operation in Criminal Matters, 34 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 324-42 (1987);
Lech Gardocki, The Socialist System, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE, supra,
at 13349; Valery Shupilov, Legal Assistance in Criminal Cases and Some Important Questions of
Extradition, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 127-36 (1983) (describing the concepts of legal assistance
and extradition as viewed by socialist states, especially the U.S.S.R.).
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This approach, however, requires a distinction to be made
between broad and narrow legal principles as this will often dictate the
choice of legal sources consulted. For example, the first question may
be whether the major legal systems of the world recognize a right to
life. The second question may be whether the taking of the life of one
person by another without legal justification constitutes a crime or,
even more specifically, what crime it constitutes.
The first query posited, the right to life, is a broad principle so the
research would involve a general inquiry, possibly beginning with the
higher law background of positive law. For example, Christianity and
Islam form the moral basis of the positive law of many countries of the
world. At the very least, their values inspire those laws or constitute
the higher law background upon which postive legal systems are
developed. Buddhist and Confucian philosophies hold a similar
position of influence in Asian countries. A second step in this general
inquiry might be a comparison of principles or rights enunciated in
provisions of national constitutions. 3 A third step might involve
research in criminal procedure laws, and a fourth might inquire into
judicial decisions and practice to ascertain whether the principle or
right enunciated in national consitutions, sometimes found in general
and abstract terms, corresponds to its normative form in criminal
procedure laws, and, finally, whether and how it is interpreted and
applied.
No two legal systems are alike, and certainly the legal provisions
of different countries on any given subject are not likely to be
identical. The question therefore is whether sameness should be
defined as: (i) identical normative formulation; (ii) identical legal
elements; or (iii) a merely substantial similarity of norms or elements.
In short, it must be decided whether it is necessary to seek sameness
of normative provisions or only a comparative equivalence of
normative provisions. The answer will depend on whether the inquiry
involves a broad "general principle" of law or a specific one. By its
very nature a broad "general principle" does not require sameness in
terms of its specific normative formulation, but a narrower or specific
principle will require greater similarity.
63. See generally Linda J. Mad, General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by All
Nations: Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, 10 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 272,301-02 (1980)
(explaining methods of determining general principles of human rights law by analyzing
comparable standards of individual protection as provided by the laws of various countries).
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B. International Instruments and Comparative National
Research 64
1. International instruments. In order to determine whether a
given international instrument has binding legal effect, the source of
the instrument must first be determined with respect to Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38 states the
sources of international law, which include conventions, customary law
(composed of opinio juris and state practice), "general principles of
law," and the writings of publicists.'
An international instrument in the nature of an agreement is
binding only upon the signatory states. However, when a significant
number of states representing the major legal systems of the world
have adhered to a given convention, it may become part of customary
international law66 and therefore become binding upon nonsignatory
states under Article 38(1)(b).67 In some cases, the reiteration and
reaffirmation of certain principles embodied in nonbinding internation-
al instruments may cause them to rise to the level of "general
principles" of international law.' Furthermore, principles which
have become universally accepted may also rise to the level of
peremptory norms of international law known as jus cogens.69
The empirical method of inductive research by which one
identifies repetitive patterns of legal pronouncements can be used in
ascertaining both customary rules of international law and "general
principles of law." Although the interpretation of the research will
vary with respect to establishing the existence of a custom as compared
to the identification of a given principle, the methodology is largely the
same.7" The similarity between customs and principles does not,
64. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
65. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 45, art. 38, 59 Stat. at 1060.
66. See Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1110, 1127-31 (1982) (describing the creation of customary law from treaties).
67. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 45, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. at 1060.
68. See Bleicher, supra note 39, at 477. This type of general principle is another source of
international law under Article 38. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 768-69.
69. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, pt.
V, § 3, art. 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 347 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980); Christenson,
supra note 20, at 592-94; Mark W. Janis, Jus Cogens: An Artful Not A Scientific Reality, 3 CoNN.
J. INT'L LAW 370, 370 (1985).
70. The difference in appraisals will depend on the nature of the custom and the principle,
which in some cases could be the same. This is indeed an overlap between sources of
international law. Professor D'Amato looks at treaties as evidence of custom and practice. See
D'AMATO, supra note 44, at 103-66. Professor Akehurst uses national laws as evidence of
1993]
250 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:235
however, end there because customs draw on principles and principles
may derive from customs.
2. Types of international instruments. Since World War II, the
United Nations and its specialized agencies, the Council of Europe, the
Organization of American States, and the Organization of African
Unity, have actively sponsored international instruments for the
protection of human rights. A number of these instruments are in the
form of international or regional multilateral conventions.71 Other
instruments developed by these organizations, particularly those of the
United Nations, are in the nature of resolutions. The labels of these
resolutions vary and include such terms as "principles," "guiding
principles," "codes of conduct," and "declarations."72
Other legally enforceable decisions originate from the courts in
the European and inter-American systems, the Commissions in all
three systems (European, American, and African), and the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe.73 Council of Europe instru-
ments vary as to their legal standing based on the different categories
of instruments. Some instruments include resolutions of the Council
of Ministers and resolutions by various technical committees of the
Legal* Directorate. The two most important bodies concerned with
criminal justice questions are the Human Rights Directorate and the
Crime Problems Division.
What is of particular interest is that the language describing
human rights in international instruments and the language employed
to describe the fundamental rights of individuals in the criminal
process are remarkably similar. In fact, the eleven categories of rights
discussed in this Article are defined in similar terms in the instruments
surveyed (see Appendix II); furthermore, the language used in
practice, as does the PCU and its successor the ICJ. See Akehurst, supra note 38, at 8-10; see also
supra text accompanying notes 44-54 discussing the use of national laws to evidence practice.
71. See, eg., ICCPR, supra note 4.
72. Some of the relevant United Nations instruments applicable to national criminal justice
processes are the BOP, supra note 22; Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, 40 U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 213,
U.N. Doc. A140/34 (1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles of Justice]; Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary (excerpts), U.N. GAOR 40/32 of 29 Nov. 1985 and 40/146 of 13
Dec. 1985 [hereinafter Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary]; Principles of Medical
Ethics, G.A. Res. 37/194,37 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 210, U.N. Doec. A137/51 (1982); Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at
185, U.N. Doc. AJ34/46 (1980); SMRTP, supra note 22.
73. See Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and
Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 585-637 (1987).
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international instruments and the language employed to describe these
rights in national constitutions is also similar. This similarity supports
the belief that there is indeed an interractive relationship between
constitutionalism and internationalism.74
IV. INSTRUMENTS AND RIGHTS SURVEYED
As has been said previously, this Article seeks to identify common
principles, standards, and norms enunciated in certain international
instruments concerning the criminal process and their concordance in
national constitutions. Some are considered as fundamental or basic
rights75 of the criminal defendant in most major legal systems, and
include eleven specifically delineated procedural rights.76
In the following section each of the enumerated rights will be
correlated with ten selected international instruments, and with 139
national constitutions.' However, the enunciation of a given right
74. Since the inception of the United Nations, the United States has been a world leader
in the development of human rights norms. Its influence in this field has been unparalleled by
any other country. See HAROLD BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTrruTION ABROAD (1986); CONSTruTONALiSM AND RIGHTS: THM INFLUENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTTUON ABROAD (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1989);
Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 53, 59-61 (1990); Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, Linkages Between
International Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 158-63 (1985).
United States constitutional approaches and terminology are clearly evidenced in the ICCPR,
supra note 4, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966), and the Universal
Declaration, supra note 4. These three major instruments have come to be known as the
"International Bill of Rights," a term reminiscent of the United States' Bill of Rights. See
RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND
PRACtiCE 175-76 (1991). "International Bill of Rights" is also the commonly used general title
in specialized United Nations publications for these three instruments. See Louis Henkin, Rights:
American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405,415 (1979); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade
in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 537,538 (1988). It should also be noted that
American Constitutionalism, as Professor Henkin describes it, has influenced other multilateral
conventions, particularly the Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, and the AMCHR, supra note
22.
75. See infra notes 83-272 and accompanying text.
76. For a complete listing of the rights in numerical order, see Appendix II, infra.
77. The empirical research involved in correlating the rights to the national constitutions was
carried out under this writer's direction and was based on the texts of the constitutions as found
in CoNSTruTIoNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
eds., 1992). A study correlating the enumerated rights, the surveyed instruments, and the national
constitutions was also carried out under this writer's direction in 1980. See Sandra Hertzberg &
Carmela Zammuto, 4 Nouvelles Atudes Pinales, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
(1981).
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and its inclusion in a given international instrument does not imply its
effective application in the domestic law of the parties to that
instrument. Similarly, the existence of a given right in a national
constitution does not necessarily mean that it is protected in practice
or uniformly and effectively observed.
Derogation from some of the rights relating to criminal trials is
allowed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in cases of declared emergencies, but with restrictions."
Derogation is also permitted under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Fundamen-
tal Freedoms) and the American Convention on Human Rights
(AMCHR). Similar derogation clauses also exist in most of the
world's constitutions.79 Furthermore, human rights relating to the
criminal process which may be guaranteed by national constitutions are
frequently violated in many countries, even in the absence of an
official declaration of a national emergency (often required by
constitutional provision prior to a derogation from enumerated rights).
This type of misuse and abuse of power is often the result of political
control of legal institutions by the ruling elites.'
On the other hand, the absence of explicit protection of any of the
enumerated rights in a national constitution does not mean that those
rights are not protected in that particular country. Indeed, some
countries without constitutions have good records in respecting the
rights of the accused in the criminal process.8 ' Many countries have
78. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(1), (2), at 53. On the question of derogations to the ICCPR
by means of establishing states of emergency, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/23/Rev. 1 (1992)
revising U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/23 (1992); Symposium, Limitation and Derogation
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 1.
79. See g., ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. II, art. 4, at 53; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
22, § I, art. 15, at 232; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. IV, art. 27(1), at 9; ITALY CONST. pt.
I, tit. I, arts. 13, 21; JAM. CONST. ch. I, §§ 20(9), 24(4)(c); KENYA CONsT. ch. V, § 83(1);
KnRBATI CONST. Ch. II, § 16(5); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II, art. 37(2); MAURITANIA
CONST. ch. II, art. 18(1).
80. See Amnesty International, Torture as Policy, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY, 79,79 (Richard Pierre Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992) (noting that
emergency legislation and martial law often facilitate gross human rights abuses, including torture,
detention, and brutal criminal sentences). In some cases, violations of rights to life, liberty, and
personal security are often perpetrated indirectly by states through the sanction or clandestine
organization of death squads, disappearances, and other forms of violations against the security
of the individual. The United States' Department of State reports on such cases in its annual
report. See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, DEPT. OF STATE (1993).
81. For example, the United Kingdom does not have a constitution, yet strives to enforce
only just laws. Cf. P.A. Stone, Some Aspects of Fundamental Rights in the English Conflict of
Laws, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 232, 232-33 (J.W. Bridge et al. eds., 1973) (stating English
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judicial decisions which protect criminal defendants in a far more
significant way than constitutional pronouncements in other coun-
tries.' As a result, the only way to determine the extent to which
each of the articulated rights is actually protected is to scrutinize the
actual practices of criminal law enforcement in the streets, police
stations, jails, and courts of a given country, and the degree of judicial
control over transgressions. However, this degree of specificity is not
required for purposes of identifying the existence of a "general
principle of law."
V. RIGHTS AND CLUSTERS OF RIGHTS
A. Identifying the Fundamental Rights
Appendix II lists eleven different rights, or clusters of rights, that
are associated with the protections afforded an individual in the
criminal process. Each of these rights has been found to exist in a
number of international instruments and national constitutions. More
importantly, each of these rights has been found to be basic to fairness
in the criminal process. Without these rights, the criminal process can
be abused and manipulated to curtail individual liberties and thus
ultimately to deny democracy. The link between individual human
rights, which are most susceptible to abuse during the criminal process,
and democracy is beyond question. Neither democracy nor human
rights can exist without one another-and neither can exist without the
courts apply conflict of laws rules loosely so as to avoid injustice and to avoid importing
oppression from foreign regimes).
82. For example, the right to be presumed innocent, the inadmissibility of evidence obtained
through illegitimate means, the right to an impartial and independent tribunal, the right to
equality of arms, the right to be tried in one's own presence, the right to counsel of one's own
choice, the right to an appointment of counsel in cases of indigency, the right to represent oneself,
the right to the assistance of an interpreter, the right to have counsel present at all stages of
criminal proceedings, and the right to an appeal are all guaranteed in the United States through
judicial interpretations of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(right to counsel on appeal for indigents); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel for every indigent accused of felony); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence). Many individual states have constitutions which also protect those
rights as well. See, eg., MASS. CoNST. pt. I, art. I (equality and natural rights of all persons);
MICH. CoNST. art. I, § 2 (equal protection of the laws); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) (right of
accused to appear and defend, in person and by counsel); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 14 (legal
remedies to be free, complete, and prompt); WASH. CoNST. art. I, § 22 (right to appear and
defend in person; right to appeal in all cases); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7 (right to speedy public trial
by an impartial judge).
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individual protection of persons brought into the criminal process,
because it is in that arena where most human rights violations occur.
1. The Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of the Person. The
inherent and inalienable right to life, liberty, and security of the person
is a cornerstone of international human rights law and of civil rights in
all countries which recognize the supremacy of the rule of law. This
right has its roots in natural law and was first articulated in positive
law in the English Magna Carta of 1215.' It was also embodied in
the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution in 1791. 4 As
enunciated in these early definitions, the protection of human life,
liberty, and personal security is basic to any system based on the rule
of law. The procedural safeguards which make up the bulk of the
rights discussed in this Article can be viewed as strengthening these
basic rights of life, liberty, and personal security.
The right to life, liberty, and personal security is found in seven
of the instruments surveyed.' Although all three components of this
important right are guaranteed by Article 3 of the Universal Declara-
tion, the right to life is treated separately in the ICCPR, the Funda-
mental Freedoms, and the AMCHR. The AMCHR makes the
exceptional guarantee of the right to life from the time of concep-
tion.' This extension of the right to life is based on natural law
principles which assume fundamental rights to exist from birth.'
Each of the instruments also provides for explicit exceptions to the
right to life. In the ICCPR and the AMCHR the death penalty is
allowed for the most serious crimes, if the sentence is pronounced by
83. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta sets forth that "[no] free man shall be taken, imprisoned,
disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." A.E. DICK
HOwARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 43 (1964) [hereinafter MAGNA CARTA].
See also Symposium, La phase priparatoire du proces pinal en droit compare, REVUE INT'L DE
DROIT IPNALpassim (1985) (discussing pretrial protections in different legal systems).
84. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
85. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220;
ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, arts. 6(1), 9(1), at 53, 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
I, arts. 2(1), 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, 226; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 3, at 72;
SMRTP, supra note 22, pt. II, art. 57, at 71; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, arts. 4, 6, at 60;
AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, arts. 4(1), 7(1), 7(2), at 2, 3.
86. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 4(1), at 2.
87. For example, the American Declaration of Independence states that "all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.... ." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
2, reprinted in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY 239 (1989).
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a competent court.?3 Exceptions in the Fundamental Freedoms are
for self-defense and killings in the course of a lawful arrest or the
quelling of a riot or insurrection. 9 The death penalty was originally
allowed in the Fundamental Freedoms as an exception to the right to
life, but has been substantially abolished by Protocol 6 to that
Convention.' The right to life is also addressed in the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) where it is
coupled with the protection of the inviolability and integrity of the
person, but exceptions to the right are merely implied through the
proscription of the arbitrary deprivation of this right.9'
In the ICCPR, the Banjul Charter, the Fundamental Freedoms,
and the AMCHR, the right to liberty and security of the person are
addressed concurrently with the provisions guaranteeing the freedom
from arbitrary arrest and detention. 2 The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRTP) provides for
detailed rules to protect the right to liberty only within the context of
imprisonment, including protection from torture and other forms of
degrading treatment and punishment. 3
The right to life, liberty, and security of the person are explicitly
embodied, (in whole or in part) sometimes together and sometimes
separately, in fifty-one of the national constitutions surveyed. 4
88. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 6(2), at 53; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art.
4(2), at 2. In neither instrument may the death penalty be imposed upon anyone who was under
eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, or upon pregnant women.
ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. MI, art. 6(5), at 53; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 4(5), at 2.
Additionally, under the AMCHR the death penalty may not be imposed on anyone over seventy
years of age. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 4(5), at 2. In 1990 the United Nations
General Assembly passed Optional Protocol 2 to the ICCPR abolishing the death penalty, but
it has not yet taken effect. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED
BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING THE FIRST PART OF ITS FORTY-FOURTH SESSION at
406-09, Press Release GA/7977 (1990).
89. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 2(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
90. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature Apr. 28,1983, art.
1, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 539 (1983). The death penalty is still permitted in time of war, id. art.
2,22 I.L.M. at 539, and pursuant to the Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 2(1), 213
U.N.T.S. at 224, in those countries which have not yet ratified Protocol 6, supra.
91. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 4, at 60.
92. See infra text accompanying note 106.
93. SMRTP, supra note 22, pt. I, arts. 27, 29, 30(1), at 69; id, pt. II, § A, art. 65, at 71.
94. ANGOLA CONST. Pt. II, art. 17; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); BAH. CONST. ch.
III, art. 15(a); BANGL. CONST. pt. I, art. 32; BARB. CONST. ch. l, § 11(a); BELIZE CONST. ch.
II, § 3(a); BOL. CONST. pt. 1, tit. 1, arts. 6,7(a); BOTS. CONSr. ch. II, § 3(a); BRAZ. CONST. tit.
I, ch. I, art. 5; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 7; CAPE VERDE CONST. tit. II, art. 31(1), (2); CHILE CONST.
ch. HI, art. 19(1), (7); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 1(a); FIJI CONST. ch. II, § 4(a); FIN. CONST. tit.
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Specifically, the right to life is mentioned in sixty-five national constitu-
tions;95 the right to security of the person, which is defined as physical
integrity in some documents, also occurs in sixty-five national constitu-
tions.' The inviolability of the person is guaranteed in thirteen
I, art. 6; GAM. CONST. ch. II, § 13(a); F.R.G. CONST. § I, art. 2(2); GREECE CONST. pt. II, arts.
5(2), 5(3); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 1(a); GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 3; GUY. CONST. pt. I, ch.
I, art. 40(1)(a); HOND. CONST. pmbl.; id. at tit. I, ch. I, art. 61; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, §§
54(1), 55(1); JAM. CONST. ch. I, § 13(a); KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 70(a); KIRIBATI CONST. ch.
I, § 3(a); LEBER. CONST. ch. I, arts. 11(a), 20(a); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 32(a); MAURITIUS
CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 3(a); PAK. CONST. pt. I, arts. 4(2)(a), 9; PARA.
CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 50; PHML. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3; POL. CONsT. ch. VIII, art. 87(1); PORT.
CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I, arts. 24(1), 25(1), 27(1); ROM. CoNsT. tit. I, ch. II, arts. 22(1), 23(1); ST.
CHRIS.-NEvIs CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); SIERRA LEONE CONsT. ch. Ill, § 15(a); SOLOM. IS. CONST.
ch. I, § 3(a); SoMAL. CONsT. ch. 1, § 3, arts. 25(1), 26; SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. II, § 1, arts. 15,
17(1); SURIN. CONST. ch. V, § 4, arts. 14, 16; SWAZ. CONST. ch. I, § 3(a); TRN. & TOBAGO
CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 4(a); TURK. CONST. ch. I, § 1, arts. 17, 19; TUvALU CONST. pt. II, div. II,
§ 11(1)(a)-(c); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(a); U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV, § 1; ZAIRE
CONST. tit. II, arts. 13, 15; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, § 13(a); ZM. CONST. ch. III, § 11(a).
95. AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 39; ANGOLA CONST. pt. II, art. 17; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch.
I, § 3(a); BAH. CONST. ch. III, art. 15(a); BANGL. CONST. pt. Ill, art. 32; BARB. CONST. ch. III,
§ 11(a); BELIz CONsT. ch. If, § 3(a); BOL. CONST. pt. 1, tit. 1, arts. 6,7(a); BoS. CONST. ch. II,
§ 3(a); BRAz. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 5; BuLO. CONST. ch. II, art. 28; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 7;
CAPE VERDE CONST. tit. I, art. 31(1), (2); CHILE CONST. ch. I, art. 19(1), (7); DOMINICA
CoNsT. ch. I, § 1(a); Fin CONST. ch. II, § 4(a); FIN. CONST. tit. I, art. 6; GAM. CONST. ch. III,
§ 13(a); F.R.G. CONST. tit. I, art. 2(2); GREECE CONST. pt. I, art. 5(2), (3); GREN. CONST. ch.
I, § 1(a); GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 3; Guy. CONST. pt. I, ch. III, art. 40(1)(a); HOND.
CONsT. pmbl.; id. at tit. I, ch. I, art. 61; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 54(1); INDIA CONST. pt. III,
art. 21; JAM. CONST. ch. I, § 13(a); JAPAN CONsT. ch. I, art. 13; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 70(a);
KIRIBATI CONST. ch. I, § 3(a); LIBER. CONST. ch. II, arts. 11(a), 20(a); MALAY. CONST. pt. II,
art. 5(1); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 32(a); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. I, § 3(a); MEX. CONST. tit. I,
ch. I, art. 14; NAMIB. CONsT. ch. II, art. 6; NAURU CONST. pt. I, § 3(a); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV,
ch. I, art. 23; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, art. 32(1); PAK. CONST. pt. I, arts. 4(2)(a), 9; PAPUA N.G.
CONST. pt. III, div. 3, subdiv. B; PARA. CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 50; PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art.
2(1); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; PORT. CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I, art. 24(1); RoM. CONST. tit. II, ch.
11, art. 22(1); ST. CHRIS.-NEViS CONST. ch. I, § 3(a); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 15(a);
SING. CONST. pt. IV, § 9(1); SOLOM. Is. CoNsT. ch. II, § 3(a); SOMAL. CONST. ch. I, § 3, arts.
25(1), 26; SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 15; SURIN. CONST. ch. V, § 4, art. 14; SWAZ. CONST. ch.
I, § 3(a); TANZ. CONST. § I, arts. 14,15(1); TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. 1, pt. 1, § 4(a); TURK.
CONST. pt. I, ch. 2, § 1, art. 17; TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. II, § 11(1)(a); UGANDA CONST. ch.
I, art. 8(2)(a); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; VENEZ. CONST. tit. III, ch. III, art. 58; VIETNAM
CONST. ch. 5, art. 70; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 13; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, art. 13(a); ZIMB.
CONST. ch. I, § 11(a).
96. ANGOLA CONST. pt. I, art. 17; ANr. & BARB. CONST. ch. I, § 3(a); BAH. CONST. ch.
I, art. 15(a); BARB. CONST. ch. I, § 11(a); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); BOL. CONST. pt. 1,
tit. 1, arts. 6,7(a); BOTs. CONST. ch. I, § 3(a); BRAZ. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5; BULG. CONsT.
ch. I, art. 30; CAMEROON CONST. pmbl. para. 7; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 7; CAPE VERDE CONST.
tit. I, art. 31(1), (2); CHILE CONST. ch. III, art. 19(1), (7); COMOROS CONST. pmbl. para. 3(2);
CONGO CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 7; CUBA CONST. ch. VI, art. 57; DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 1(a);
ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § I, art. 19(1), (17); Fm CONST. ch. H, § 4(a); FIN. CONST. tit. II,
art. 6; GAM. CONsT. ch. I, § 13(a); F.R.G. CONsT. tit. I, art. 2(2); GREECE CONST. art. 5(2), (3);
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constitutions,9 and it could reasonably be argued that this term
includes all three of the designated rights. Finally, in another sixteen
constitutions the right to liberty or freedom is secured,9 usually
within the context of protections accorded in the right to freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention.
The death penalty has been abolished in a total of forty-eight
countries; at least fifteen countries have done so through constitutional
enactments, with three additional countries constitutionally restricting
the death penalty to time of war.' Of the approximately forty-five
GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 1(a); GUAT. CONST. tit. If, ch. I, art. 3; GUY. CONST. pt. I, ch. mT, §
40(1)(a); HOND. CONST. pmbl.; id at tit. m, ch. I, art. 61; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 55(1); JAM.
CONST. ch. 1I, § 13(a); KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 70(a); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. H, § 3(a); LIBER.
CONST. ch. I, arts. 11(a), 20(a); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 32(a); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II, §
3(a); MEx. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 16; MONACO CONST. tit. III, art. 19; MONG. CONST. ch. H, art.
16(13); MYANMAR CONST. ch. XI, art. 159; NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 3(a); NICAR. CONST. it. IV,
ch. I, art. 25(1), (2); PAK. CONST. pt. I, arts. 4(2)(a), 9; PARA. CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 50; PERU
CONsT. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(l), (20); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; PORT. CONsT. pt. I, § II, ch. I, arts.
25(1), 27(1); ROM. CONST. tit. II, ch. 11, art. 23(1); ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. II, § 3(a);
SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. I, § 15(a); SOLOM. Is. CONST. ch. H, § 3(a); SOMAL. CONST. ch. I,
arts. 25(1), 26; SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. H, art. 17; SUDAN CONST. pt. I, art. 21; SURIN. CONST.
ch. V, § 4, art. 16(1); SWAZ. CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); SYRIA CONST. ch. I, pt. 4, art. 25(1); TRIN.
& TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 4(a); TURK. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, art. 19; TUVALU CONST.
pt. II, div. 2, § 11(1)(c); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, art. 8(2)(a); U.S. CONST. amend. IV; VENEZ.
CONsT. tit. M, ch. III, art. 60; VIEmTNAM CONST. ch. 5, art. 69; ZAIRE CONST. tit. I1, arts. 13;
ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, art. 13(a); ZM. CONST. ch. I, § 11(a).
97. ALB. CONST. pt. 1, ch. I(C), art. 56; ALG. CONST. tit. I, ch. 4, art. 33; CAMBODIA CONST.
ch. III, art. 35; CENT. APRL REP. CONST. pmbl., para. 16; P.R.C. CONST. ch. 2, art. 37; ET.
CONST. pt 2, ch. 7, art. 43(1); ITALY CONsT. art. 2; KOREA (DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBuC
OF) CONsT. ch. IV, art. 64; MADAG. CONsT. tit. II, art. 42; NETH. CONST. ch. 2, art. 11; POL.
CONST. ch. 8, art. 87(1); SEN. CONST. tit. II, art. 6; TUNIS. CONST. ch. I, art. 5.
98. BELG. CONST. tit. I, art. 7; BENIN CONST. ch. VIII, art. 136; P.R.C. CONST. ch. I1, art.
37; DEN. CONST. pt. VIII, § 71(1); EGYPT CONST. pt. 3, art. 41; ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 13;
JORDAN CONST. ch. H, § 7; KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II, art. 12(1); KUWAIT CONST. pt.
III, art. 30; LIECH. CONST. ch. IV, art. 32; Lux. CONST. ch. II, art. 12; RWANDA CONST. ch. II,
art. 12; TAIWAN CONST. ch. I, art. 8; THAIL. CONST. ch. I, § 28; U.A.E. CONST. pt. III, art. 26;
YEMEN CONST. tit. H, art. 32-A.
99. For the most recent listing of countries which have eliminated the death penalty, see
Amnesty International, Press Release of the International Secretariat, Feb. 1993. At least fifteen
countries have legally (constitutionally or otherwise) eliminated the death penalty, with a wartime
crimes exception. Id. Those countries which have abolished the death penalty by constitutional
means are: AUS. CONST. ch. III(B), art. 85; BOL. CONST. pt. 1, tit. 2, art. 17; BRAZ. CONST. tit.
II, ch. I, art. 5(XLVII)(a) (ban limited to peacetime); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. III, art. 35; CAPE
VERDE CONST. tit. II, art. 31(4); COLOM. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 11; DOM. CONST. tit. II, § I,
art. 8(1); ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § I, art. 19(1); F.R.G. CONST. tit. IX, art. 102; HOND.
CONST. tit. m, ch. H, art. 66; ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 27 (ban limited to peacetime);
MONACO CONST. tit. III, art. 20; NETH. CONST. ch. 6, art. 114; NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, arL
23; PERU CONST. tit. IV, ch. IX, art. 235 (ban excludes treason in case of foreign war); PORT.
CONsT. pt. I, § II, ch. I, art. 24(2); SWED. CONST. ch. 2, art. 4; VENEZ. CONST. tit. II, ch. M, art.
5S.
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constitutions which specifically provide for the death penalty, twenty-
four (virtually all former British colonies) also provide for other
exceptions to the right to life, such as killings committed in the course
of lawful defense of self or property, a lawful arrest, suppressing a riot
or mutiny, preventing the commission of a crime, or lawfully declared
wars."° Only one country which provides for the death penalty does
not also constitutionally guarantee the right to life. 1'
2. The Right to Recognition Before the Law and Equal Protection
of the Law. By insuring the nondiscriminatory protection and
application of the laws, this right is another of the cornerstone
protections of human rights in the criminal process. It includes the
recognition of the individual as a legal personality who enjoys equal
protection and application of the law. The right appears in six of the
instruments surveyed in this Article."° Although the protection
against discrimination is implicit, the Fundamental Freedoms include
an express nondiscrimination clause with respect to the rights and
freedoms it guarantees."° The right to recognition before the law
and/or equal protection of the law is protected in over 108 national
constitutions. 4 There are also a number of specialized international
100. (An asterisk indicates those constitutions which provide further exceptions to the right
to life in addition to the death penalty.) ANT. & BARB. CoNsT.* ch. I, § 4; BAH. CONST.* ch. III,
§ 16; BANGL. CONST. pt. III, art. 32; BARB. CONST.* ch. I, § 12; BELIZE CONST.* ch. II, § 4;
BoTs. CONST.* ch. II, § 4; CHILE CONST. ch. III, art. 19(1); DOMINICA CONST.* ch. 1, § 2; EQ.
GUINEA CONST. fit. III, ch. I, art. 20(1); Fin CONST.* ch. II, § 5; GAM. CONST.* ch. III, § 14;
GREECE CONST. pt. II, art. 7(3); GREN. CONST.* ch. I, § 2; GUAT. CONST.* tit. II, ch. I, art. 18;
GUY. CONST.* pt. 2, tit. 1, art. 138; INDIA CONST. pt. I, art. 21; JAM. CONST.* ch. III, § 14;
JAPAN CONST. ch. IlI, art. 31; KENYA CONST.* ch. V, § 71; KIRIBATI CONST.* ch. II, § 4; LINER.
CONST. ch. I, art. 20(a); MALAY. CONST. PL II, art. 5(1); MALTA CONST.* ch. IV, § 33;
MAuRnTIUS CONST.* ch. II, § 4; MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 14; MONG. CONST. ch. II, art. 16(1);
NAURU CONST.* pt. II, § 4; NIG. CONST.* ch. IV, § 32; PAK. CONST. pt. Ii, ch. 1, art. 9; PAPUA-
N.G. CONST.* pt. III, div. M, subdiv. B, § 35(1); PARA. CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 65; PHIL. CONST.
art. Il, § I; ST. CHRIS.- NEVIS CONST.* ch. II, § 4; SIERRA LEONE CONST.* ch. III, § 16; SING.
CONST. Pt. IV, art. 9(1); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. II, § 4; SOMAL CONST. ch. 2, art. 25; SRI LANKA
CONST. ch. III, art. 13(4); TRiN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. 1, pt. 1, § 4(a); TuRK. CONST* pt. 2, ch.
2, art. 17; UGANDA CONST.* ch. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art.
13; ZAMBIA CONST.* pt. III, art. 14; ZI n. CONST. ch. I, § 12.
101. See SRI LANKA CONST. ch. I.
102. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 5(a), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220;
ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, arts. 16, 26, at 55; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, arts. 6, 7, at
73; SMRTP, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 6(1), at 67; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, arts. 3, 5, at
60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, arts. 3, 24, at 2, 8.
103. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § 1, art. 14,213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
104. AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 38; ALB. CONST. pt. I, ch. II, art. 40; ALG. CONST. tit. I, ch. 4,
art. 28; ANGOLA CONST. pt. H, arL 18; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); ARG. CONST. pt. I,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
instruments that deal with the prohibition of discrimination, but they
are not covered by this survey. 5
3. The Right to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention. The
right to liberty is not absolute and can be lawfully and reasonably
curtailed. The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention
seeks to delineate appropriate exceptions to the right of liberty."°
The protection against the arbitrary deprivation of freedom is
art. 16; Aus. CONST. ch. I, art. 7(1); BAI. CONST. ch. III, art. 15(a); BANGL. CONST. pt. Ell, art.
27; BARB. CONST. ch. III, § 11(c); BELG. CONST. tit. I1, art. 6; BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(1);
BENIN CoNsT. ch. VIII, art. 122; BOTS. CONST. ch. H, § 3(a); BRAZ. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5;
Bu. CONST. ch. I, art. 6(2); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. I, art. 30; CAN. CONST. sched. B, pt. I, §
15(1); CAPE VERDE CONST. tit. II, art. 22; CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. pmbl.; CHILE CONST. ch. I,
art. 19(2),(3); P.R.C. CONsT. ch. H, art. 33; COMOROS CONST. fit. I, art. 3; CONGO CONST. pt. I,
tit. II, art. 11; COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 33; C6TE D'IVOIRE CONST. tit. I, art. 6; DOMINICA
CONST. ch. I, § 1(a); ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § I, art. 19(5); EGYPT CONST. pt. I, art. 40;
EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 20(3); ETH. CONST. pt. II, ch. VII, art. 35, para. 1; FMn
CONST. ch. II, § 4(a); FIN. CONST. pt. II, art. 5; GAM. CONST. ch. III, § 13(a); F.R.G. CONST. ch.
I, art. 3; GREECE CONST. art. 4(1); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 1(a); GuY. CONST. pt. I, ch. m, art.
40(1)(a); HoND. CoNST. tit. III, ch. I, arts. 60, 61; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, §§ 56-57(1); INDIA
CONST. pt. I, art. 14; IRAQ CONST. ch. I, art. 19; IR. CONsT. art. 40; ITALY CONST. art. 3; JAM.
CONST. ch. m, art. 13(a); JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 14; JORDAN CONST. ch. II, art. 6(i); KENYA
CONST. ch. V, art 70(a); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II,
art. 11(1); KuWArr CONsT. pt. III, art. 29; LIBER. CONST. ch. III, art. 11(c); LIBYA CONST. ch.
I, art. 5; LIECH. CONST. ch. IV, art. 31, para. 1; Lux. CONST. ch. II, art. 11, para. 1; MALAY.
CONST. pt. II, § 8(1); MALDIVES CONST. § 5; MALI CONST. tit. I, art 1, para. 5; MALTA CONST.
ch. IV, § 32(a); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); MEx. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 4, para. 1;
MONACO CONST. tit. I, art. 17; MOROCCO CONST. tit. I, art. 5; MYANMAR CONST. ch. II, art.
22(a); NAMIB. CONST. ch. I, art. 10(1); NAURU CONsr. pt. II, § 3(a); NEPAL CONST. pt. 3, §
11(1); NETH. CONST. ch. I, art. 1; NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 27, para. 1; PAK. CONST. pt.
I, art. 4(1); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. III, div. III, subdiv. B, § 37(1); PARA. CONST. ch. V(1), art.
54; PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(2); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; POL CONST. ch. 8, art. 67(2);
PORT. CONsT. pt. I, § I, arts. 13(1), 20(1); ROM. CONsT. tit. II, ch. I, art. 16(1); RWANDA CONST.
ch. II, art. 16; ST. CHIS.-NEViS. CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); SAo TOMP & PRINCIPE CONST. ch. II, art.
9(1); SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 12(1); SOLOM. Is. CONST. ch. H, § 3(a); SOMAL. CONST. ch. I, §
1, art. 67; SPAIN CoNsT. tit. I, ch. II, art. 14; SRI LANKA CONST. ch. III, § 12(1); SUDAN CONST.
pt. III, art. 17(1); SWAZ. CONST. ch. II, § 3(a); SWED. CONST. ch. I, art. 9; Swrrz. CONST. ch. I,
art. 4; SYRIA CONST. ch. 1, pt. 4, art. 25(3); TAIWAN CONST. ch. II, art. 7; TANz. CONST. § II,
art. 13(1); THAIL. CONST. ch. I, § 4; TRIN. & TOBAGO CONsT. ch. 1, pt. I, § 4(b); TuNIs. CONST.
ch. I, art. 6; TURK. CONST. pt. I, § X, art. 10; TUVALU CONST. pt. 11, div. H, § 11(1)(d); UGANDA
CONST. ch. III, art. 8(1), (2)(a); U.A.E. CONST. pt. I, art. 25; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1;
VIETNAM CONST. ch. V, art. 55; YEMEN CONsT. tit. I, art. 27; ZAIRE CONST. tit. H, art. 12;
ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, art. 13(a); ZIMB. CONST. ch. I, §§ 11(a), 18(1); see MADAG. CONST. tit.
I, art. 6; NErH. CONST. ch. I, art. 1; VENEz. CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 49.
105. For example, see the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A134/46 (1979).
106. See PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
PERSPEcTIVE (Stanislaw Frankowski & Dinah Shelton eds., 1992).
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expressed in the Magna Carta,"°7 the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution,1 " and the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man."° It is an essential element of the due process protections
which provide safeguards for any person from abuse of power.1 °
The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention is
protected in six of the instruments surveyed.1 In some instruments
the right is expressed as a general exception to the right to personal
liberty, as in the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion.' In other instruments exceptions to the right itself are
specificially noted. For example, Article 5 of the Fundamental
Freedoms lists the following exceptions: (a) detention after conviction
by a competent court; (b) lawful arrest for noncompliance with a
lawful order of the court; (c) lawful arrest on suspicion of having
committed a crime or to prevent the commission of a crime; (d)
detention of minors; (e) detention of the mentally ill, vagrants, addicts,
or those infected with contagious diseases; and (f) detention of aliens
to prevent illegal entry into a country or for the purposes of deporta-
tion or extradition."1 Both Article 5 of the Fundamental Freedoms
and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (BOP) also include a list of
procedural rights following an arrest which are designed to insure
judicial control over unlawful deprivations of personal liberty. A
person has the right to be informed of the reasons for his or her
107. MAGNA CARTA, supra note 83, ch. 38.
108. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
109. Article 7 provides that "no individual shall be accused, arrested or detained, except in
the cases prescribed by legislation, and according to the procedures it has laid down." THE
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN (Aug. 26,1789) reprinted in HUMAN
RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 744 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987).
110. See supra text accompanying note 83.
111. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 9(1), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
I, art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 2, at 298; Universal Declaration, supra
note 4, art. 9, at 73; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 6, at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt.
I, ch. II, art. 7(3), at 3.
112. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. mI, art. 9(1), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
I, art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 9, at 73; Banjul, supra
note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 6, at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. 1I, art. 7(3), at 3.
113. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, art. 5(1)(a)-(f), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
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arrest,n4 to be granted a speedy trial," 5 and to challenge the law-
fulness of his or her arrest before a judge. 6
The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention is
protected in at least 119 national constitutions."7 The right may be
114. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 5(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; BOP, supra
note 22, princ. 10, at 298.
115. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
116. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 5(4), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; BOP, supra
note 22, princ. 11(1), at 298.
117. AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 41, para. 2; ALB. CONST. pt. 1, ch. II, art. 56; ALG. CONST. ch.
IV, art. 44; ANGOLA CONST. pt. II, art. 23; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 5(1), (5); ARG. CONST.
1st pt., art. 18; BAH. CONST. ch. Ill, art. 19(1); BANGL CONST. pt. I, art. 32; BARB. CONST. ch.
I, § 13(1); BELG. CONST. tit. II, art. 7; BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); BENIN CONST. ch. VIII, art.
136, para. 2; BOL. CONST. pt. 1, tit. 2, art. 9; BRAz. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5(LXI); BULG.
CONsT. ch. H, art. 30(2); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. I, art. 35; CAMEROON CONST. pmbl., para. 12;
CAN. CONST. sched. B, pt. I, §§ 9, 10; CAPE VERDE CONST. tit. II, art. 31(2); CHILE CONST. ch.
I, art. 19(7)(b), (c); P.R.C. CONST. art. 37, paras. 2, 3; COLOM. CONST. tit. II, ch. 1, art. 29;
COMOROS CONST. tit. IV, art. 43; CONGO CONST. pt. I, tit. II, arts. 7, 10; COsTA RICA CONST.
tit. IV, art. 37; C6TE D'IVOIRE CONST. tit. VII, art. 62; CUBA CONST. ch. VI, art. 57; DEN. CONsT.
pt. VIII, § 71(2); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 3(1); DOM. REP. CONST. tit. II, § I, art. 8(2);
ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § I, art. 19(17)(h); EGYPT CONST. pt. I, art. 41; EQ. GUINEA
CONST. tit. Im, ch. 1, arts. 20(1), para. 4,20(15); ETH. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 7, art. 44(1); FM CONST.
ch. II, § 6(1); FR. CONST. tit. VIII, art. 66; GABON CONST. tit. VII, art. 59; GAM. CONST. ch. I,
§ 15(1); F.R.G. CONST. ch. IX, art. 104(1); GREECE CONST. pt. I1, arts. 5(3), 6; GREN. CONST. ch.
I, § 3(1); GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 6; GUINEA CONST. tit. II, art. 9; GuY. CONST. pt. H, tit.
I, art. 139(1); HOND. CONST. it. II, ch. II, arts. 69, 84; HUNG. CONsT. ch. XII, § 55(1); ICE.
CONST. ch. VII, art. 65; IRAQ CONST. ch. I, art. 22(b); IR. CONST. art. 40(4)(1); ITALY CONST.
pt. I, tit. I, art. 13, para. 2; JAM. CONsT. ch. M, art. 15(1), JAPAN CONsT. ch. III, arts. 33, 34;
JORDAN CONST. ch. II, § 8; KENYA CONsT. ch. V, § 72(1); KIRIBATI CONsT. ch. II, § 5(1);
KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II, art. 12(1), (3); KOREA (DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF) CONsT. ch. IV, art. 64; KUWAIT CONsT. pt. III, art. 31, para. 1; LIBER. CONsT. ch. I, art.
20(a); LIECH. CONST. ch. IV, art. 32; Lux. CONST. ch. II, art. 12; MALAY. CONsT. pt. II, art. 5(1);
MALI CONST. tit. 1, art. 7; MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 34(1); MAURmUS CONST. ch. II, § 5(1);
MEx. CONST. tit. 1, ch. I, art. 16; MONACO CONST. tit. M, art. 19; MOROCCO CONST. tit. I, art.
10; MYANMAR CONST. ch. XI, art. 159 (b); NAMm. CONT. ch. I, art. 11(1); NAURU CONST. pt.
II, § 5(1); NEPAL CONST. pt. 3, § 14(5), NETm. CONST. ch. 1, art. 15(1); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV,
ch. I, art. 33; NIGER CONST. tit. XII, art. 84; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 34(1); NOR. CONST. pt. E, art.
99; PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. I, div. I, subdiv. C, § 42(1); PARA. CONST. cl. V, art. 59; PERU
CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(20)(g); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; POL. CONST. ch. 8, art. 87(1); PORT.
CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I, art. 27(2); ROM. CONsT. tit. H, ch. II, art. 23(2); RWANDA CONST. ch. II,
art. 12, para. 2; ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 17(1);
SOLoM. Is. CONST. ch. H, § 5(1); SOMAL. CONST. ch. II, art. 26(2); SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. II, §
I, art. 17; SRI LANKA CONST. ch. I, art. 13(1); SUDAN CONST. pt. I, art. 21; SURiN. CONST. ch.
V, art. 16(2); SYRIA CONST. ch. 1, pt. 1, art. 28(2); TAIWAN CONST. ch. II, art. 8; TANZ. CONST.
§ 3, art. 15(2); THAIL. CONST. ch. I, art. 28; TRiN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. 1, pt. 1, § 5(2)(a);
TURK. CONST. pt. 1, ch. 2, § 3, art. 19, para. 2; TUvALU CONST. pt. H(1), arts. 17(1)(f)-(g), 18(2);
UGANDA CONST. ch. H, art. 10(1); U.A.E. CONT., art. 26; U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV, §
1; VENEZ. CONST. tit. H, ch. H, art. 60(1), para. 1; VIETNAM CONST. ch. 5, art. 69; YEMEN
CONST. tit. II, art. 32-B; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 15, para. 2; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, § 15(1);
ZmB. CONST. ch. I, § 13(1).
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1
expressed negatively, as in the prohibition of arbitrary deprivations of
liberty, or it may be expressed as a specific exception to the general
right of liberty, which is listed as a procedural protection. This second
method is used by the majority of the constitutions of countries which
adopted the common law of England, as well as by the Fundamental
Freedoms.
4. The Right to Freedom from Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. A more concrete interpretation
of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person, this right
protects the dignity and physical and psychological integrity of a
person. Its roots are found in the prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishments" in the English Bill of Rights of 1688 and in the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution."1 The
modem right extends not only to punishment, but also to other cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatments and is therefore far broader than
its antecedents. The proscription of torture, for example, is also aimed
at the use of techniques prevalent in some of the inquisitorial systems
of Europe well into the nineteenth century which elicited information
from detainees and confessions from suspects." 9
This right is found in all of the surveyed instruments." Unlike
the Universal Declaration and the Fundamental Freedoms, the ICCPR
and the AMCHR explicitly provide protection of the dignity of a
detained person. 2' The ICCPR further solidifies the right by provid-"
ing for the segregation of juveniles from adults and convicted prisoners
from those awaiting trial to whatever extent possible.' The
AMCHR expands on the concept of personal dignity by protecting the
118. See I Win. & M. Sess. 2, c2 (1688) (Eng.); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
119. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 28, at 10; see also Convention Against Torture,
supra note 22, pt. I, art. 11, at 198 ("Each State Party shall keep under systematic review
interrogation rules, instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for custody...
with a view to preventing any cases of torture.").
120. Convention Against Torture, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 1, at 197, pt. I, art. 16, at 198;
Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 5(b), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220; ICCPR,
supra note 4, pt. HI, art. 7, at 53; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S.
at 224; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 6, at 298; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 5, at 73;
SMRTP, supra, note 22, pt. I, arts. 31, 32(1),(2), at 69; European Convention on Protection of
Detainees, supra note 22, ch. I, art. 1, at 1154; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 5, at 60;
AMCHR, supra note 22, ch. II, art. 5(2), at 2.
121. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. II, art. 10(1), at 54; AMCHR, supra note 22, ch. II, art. 5(2),
at 2.
122. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. II, art. 10(2)(a), (b), at 54.
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"physical, mental and moral integrity" of the person."z The Banjul
Charter entitles an individual to "respect for his life and the integrity
of his person" along with the core language of this right."l It
protects against "all forms of exploitation" and "degradation" and
specifically mentions slavery and the slave trade as examples. 5 A
number of international instruments prohibit slavery and related
practices." In addition, prohibitions against apartheid and genocide
may be included within the ambit of this right, while the ICCPR
includes protection against unconventional medical or scientific
experimentation on human beings."
The right to be free from torture and cruel and degrading
treatment or punishment is provided for in at least eighty-one national
constitutions." Although the death penalty is not historically
123. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 5(1), at 2.
124. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 4, at 60.
125. Id. pt. I, ch. I, art. 5, at 60.
126. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 8, at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art.
4(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 4, at 73; AMCHR, supra note
22, pt. I, ch. 11, art. 6, at 3; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Enslavement as an International Crime,
23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL 445-517 (1991).
127. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. Hm, art. 7, at 53.
128. AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 42; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 7(1); ARG. CONST. 1st pt.,
art. 18; BAH. CONST. ch. I, art. 17(1); BANGL CoNST. pt. I, art. 35(5); BARB. CONST. ch. I,
§ 15(1); BEI.ZE CONST. ch. II, § 7; BOL. CONST. pt. 1, fit. 2, art. 12; BoTs. CONST. ch. II, § 7(1);
BRAZ. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5(11), (XLVII (e)); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. I, art. 35; CAN.
CONST. pt. I, § 12; CAPE VERDE CONST. it. II, art. 31(3); CHAD CONST. tit. V, art. 40; COLOM.
CONsT. tit. II, ch. I, art. 12; COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 40; DOMI-ICA CONST. tit. I, art. 5;
Don. REP. CONST. tit. 1, § I, art. 8(1); EcUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. U, § I, art. 19(1); EGYPT
CONST. pt. 3, art. 42; EQ. GUINEA tit. 3, ch. I, art. 20(1); Fmn CONST. ch. 2, § 8; GAM. CONST. ch.
I, § 17(1); F.R.G. CONST. ch. IX, art 104(1); GREEcE CONST. pt. I1, art. 7(2); GREN. CONST.
ch. I, § 5(1); GUAT. CONST. tit. U, ch. I, art. 19(a); GUY. CONST. pt. 2, tit. 1, art. 141(1); HOND.
CONST. tit. I, ch. U, art 68; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 54(2); IRAQ CONsT. ch. III, art. 22(a);
ITALY CONST. pt. 1, tit. 1, art. 13, para. 4; JAM. CONST. ch. III, § 17; JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art.
36; KUWAIT CONST. pt. III, arts. 31, 34; LIBER. CONST. ch. I, art. 21(e); LIBYA CONST. ch. II,
art. 31(c); MALDIVES CONST. § 7; MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 36(1); MAURrTUS CONST. ch. II, §
7(1); MEX. CONST. fit. I, ch. I, art. 22, para. 1; MONACO CoNST. tit. I, art. 20; MYANMAR
CONST. ch. II, art. 24; NAMIB. CONsT. ch. I, art. 8(2)(b); NAURU CONST. pt. H, § 7; NEPAL
CONST. pt. III, art. 14(4); NICAR. CONST. fit. IV, ch. I, art. 36; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 33(1)(a);
NOR. CONST. pt. I, art. 96; PAK. CONST. pt. 1, ch. I, art. 14(2); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. I, div.
III, subdiv. A, § 36(1); PARA. CONST. ch. V, pt. I, art. 65; PERU CONST. fit. IV, ch. IX, art. 234,
para. 1; PHH. CONST. art. IV, § 21; PORT. CONST. pL 1, §11, ch. I, art. 25(2); ROM. CONST. tit. 11,
ch. II, art. 22(2); ST. CHRIs.-NEVIS CONS. ch. U1, § 7; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 20(1);
SOLOM. Is. CONST. ch. II, § 7; SOMAL. CONST. ch. II, art. 27; SPAIN CONST. ch. II, § 1, art. 15; SRI
LANKA CONST. ch. mI, § 11; SUDAN CONST. pt. I, art. 29; SURIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 9(2); SwAZ.
CONST. ch. H, § 7(1); SWED. CONST. ch. 2, art. 5; Swrrz. CONsT. ch. I, art. 65(2); SYRIA CONST.
ch. I, pt. IV, art. 28(3); TANz. CONST. § 3, art. 13(6)(e); TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. 1, pt. 1, §
5(2)(b); TURK. CONST. pt. H, ch. U1, § I, art. 17, para. 3; TuVALU CONST. pt. U1, div. 3, subdiv. A,
§ 19(c), (d); UGANDA CONST. ch. III, art. 12(1); U.A.E. CONST. pt. 3, arts. 26,28; U.S. CONST.
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considered to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment"" 9 and is
still in practice in a majority of the countries of the world, an
increasing number of countries have either abolished it, restricted it to
time of war, or have completely refrained from practicing it.130 This
trend is evinced by the adoption of Protocol 6 to the Fundamental
Freedoms' and the passage of Optional Protocol 2 of the ICCPR
by the United Nations General Assembly. 2
The protections from torture and similar practices are particularly
important during pretrial interrogations and therefore encompass
a privilege against self-incrimination."3  Wo of the instruments
examined protect the privilege against self-incrimination, as does the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 33 The ICCPR
asserts the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself as well
as the right not to confess guilt; the AMCHR includes the same
protections, although it uses the term "plead guilty" instead of
"confess."'" The BOP has explicit provisions against the practice of
amend. VIII; VENEZ. CONST. tit. I, ch. m, art. 60(3), (7); VIETNAM CONST. ch. 5, art. 69, para.
3; YEMEN CONST. tit. II, arts. 32-B, 33; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 13, para. 2; ZAMBIA CONST. pt.
III, § 17(1); ZIMB. CONST. ch. fII, § 15(1).
129. The death penalty was commonplace at the time of the enactment of the English and
American Bills of Rights, see, eg., JAMES AVERY JOYCE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:. A WORLD
VIEw 119-93 (1961) (tracing the development of the abolitionist movements in England and
America), and is still not considered to violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
130. See supra note 99. The European Court on Human Rights, in interpreting the ECHR,
decided that the Death Row Syndrome in the United States violated its provision on cruel
treatment. In an unprecedented decision, the Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3945
(1989), the Court held that a person sought for extradition from the United Kingdom to the
United States could not be so extradited as it would violate that person's human rights. See also
Stephan Breitenmoser, et al., Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L,
L. 845, 845 (1990); Michael Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 86 (1992).
131. See supra text accompanying note 90.
132. See supra note 90.
133. Some of the national constitutions surveyed specifically refer to the protections in this
context. For example, see EGYPT CONST. pt. 3, art. 42 (protections apply only after arrest,
detainment, or restriction of freedom); LIBYA CONST. ch. II, art. 31(c) (protections apply during
incarceration); NOR. CONST. art. 96 (no interrogation by torture); PAK. CONST. pt. II, ch. 1, §
14(2) (no torture to extract evidence).
134. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Privilege Against Self-incrimination: A Historical Analysis
and Contemporary Appraisal in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 655 (John N. Hazard & Wenceslas J. Wagner eds., 1974).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V; ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(3)(g), at 54; AMCHR, supra
note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(g), at 4.
136. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(g), at 4. The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution has also been interpreted to apply to both aspects of the privilege.
See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,581 (1968) (recognizing defendants' Fifth Amendment
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detaining prisoners incommunicado, a crucial element in the practice
of coercive interrogations.137 No less than forty-eight national
constitutions provide for a privilege against self-incrimination,' but
in over half of these instruments the privilege is explicitly articulated
only in relation to the giving of testimony at trial.'39
5. The Right to be Presumed Innocent. The presumption of
innocence is inextricably linked to fairness in criminal due process and
is intrinsically related to the protection of human dignity. Above all,
it guarantees against abuse of power by those in authority and ensures
the preservation of the basic concepts of justice and fairness.
However, the meaning of the presumption varies as between adver-
sary-accusatorial systems of criminal justice and inquisitorial ones.
Furthermore, many legal systems distinguish between the presumption
of innocence and proof of guilt. Finally, the standard of proof of guilt
also varies as between adversary-accusatorial models of criminal justice
and inquistiorial ones. The former frequently relies on the standard
of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the latter on the personal
conviction of the judge byond his or her subjective moral doubt. The
right not to plead guilty).
137. BOP, supra note 22, princ. 11(2), at 298.
138. ARG. CONST. 1st pt., art. 18; ANT. & BARB. CONST. Ch. II, § 15(7); BAH. CoNsT. ch. I,
§ 20(7); BANGL. CONsT. pt. I, art. 35(4); BARB. CONST. ch. I, § 18(7); BELIZE CONST. ch. II,
§ 6(6); BoTs. CONST. Ch. II, § 10(7); CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(c); CHILE CONST. ch. III, art.
19(7)(f); COLOM. CONST. tit. II, ch. 1, art. 33; COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 36; DOMINICA
CONST. ch. I, § 8(7); DOM. REP. CONST. tit. II, § 1, art. 8(2)(i); ECUADOR CONST. tit. II, § I, art.
19(17)(f) (limited to matters involving criminal guilt); EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. 3, ch. 1, art. 20(18);
ETH. CONsT. pt. 2, ch. 7, art. 45, para. 4; FI CoNST. ch. 2, § 11(7); GAM. CONST. ch. III, § 20(7);
GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(7); GuY. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, art. 144(7); INDIA CONST. pt. III, art.
20(3); JAPAN CONST. ch. I, art. 38; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(7); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. i, §
10(7); LINER. CONST. ch. I, art. 21(c); MALTA CONsT. ch. IV, § 39(10); MAURITIUS CONST. ch.
II, § 10(7); MEX. CONST. tit. 1, ch. 1, art. 20, para. 2; NAMm. CONST. ch. 3, art. 12(1)(f); NAURU
CONST. pt. II, § 10(8); NEPAL CONST. pt. 3, § 14(3); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(7); NIG.
CONST. ch. IV, §§ 34(2), 35(10); PAK. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, § 13(b); PAN. CONST. tit. III, ch. 1, art.
24; PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. UI(3)(B), § 37(10); PARA. CONT. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 62; PERU CONST.
tit. 1, ch. 1, art. 2(20)(k); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 20; ST. CHlRs.-NEVIS. CONsT. ch. II, § 10(7);
SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(7); SPAIN CNST. tit. 1, ch. II, art. 24(2); TUVALU CONST. pt.
H(3)(A), § 22(10); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, § 15(7); U.S. CONT. amend. V; YEMEN CONST. tit.
H, art. 32(B); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, § 20(7); ZmB. CONsT. ch. III, § 18(8).
139. This is the case in many of the former British colonies. Guatemala further restricts the
right by providing the privilege at trial in Article 16, but making an exception in Article 8 that
a prisoner may be compelled if before a "competent judicial authority." GUAT. CONST. tit. II,
ch. I, arts. 8, 16.
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differences in the rules of evidence are also quite significant."4 The
basis of this right lies in the Anglo-Saxon rejection of the inquisitorial
mode of criminal procedure in favor of an adversarial mode with the
burden of proof placed on the state.'41
The right to be presumed innocent is guaranteed in five of the
instruments surveyed,' 42 as well as in sixty-seven of the surveyed
constitutions. 43  Several other constitutions guarantee that an
140. See La preuve en procidure p~nale comparielEvidence in Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 63 REVUE INT'L DE DROIT PANAL passim (1992).
141. This model is now strongly gaining favor in traditionally inquisitorial-based states such
as Italy, which reformed its Code of Criminal Procedure in 1989 and adopted, in part, this
approach. William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The
Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1 (1992); Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Law Country:
The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMPLE L. REv. 1211 (1989). For a
comparative analysis of the two models, see John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental
Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L. J. 1549 (1978); Herbert L. Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
142. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. mI, art. 14(2), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 6(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; SMRTP, supra note 22, pt. II, §C, art. 84(2), at 73; Banjul, supra
note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(b), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2), at 4.
143. AFG. CONST. ch. I, art. 41; ALG. CoNsT. ch. IV, art. 42; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II,
§ 15(2)(a); BAH. CONST. ch. I, § 20(2)(a); BARB. CONsT. ch. III, § 18(2)(a); BEIZE CONST. ch.
II, § 6(3)(a); BOL CoNsT. pt. 1, tit. 2, art. 16; BoAs. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(a); BULG. CONST. ch.
2, art. 31(3); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. III, art. 35; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(d); COLOM. CONST. tit.
II, ch. I, art. 29; COMOROS CONST. tit. IV, art. 43; COTE D'IVOIRE CONST. tit. VII, art. 62;
DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(a); ECUADOR CONST. tit. II, § I, art. 19(17)(g); EGYPT CONST.
pt. I, art. 67; EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. I, ch. 1, art. 20(17); FiM CONST. ch. II, § 11(2)(a);
GABON CONST. tit. VII, art. 59; GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(a); GuAT. CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art.
14; GUY. CONST. pt. II, tit. II, art. 144(2)(a); HOND. CONST. tit. III, ch. II, art. 89; HUNG. CONST.
ch. XII, § 57(2); IRAQ CONST. ch. III, art. 20(a); JAM. CONST. ch. III, § 20(5); KENYA CONST. ch.
V, § 77(2)(a); KIRmATI CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(a); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II, art.
27(4); KUWAIT CONST. pt. I, art. 34; LIBER. CONST. ch. I, art. 21(h); LIBYA CONST. art. 31(c);
MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(5); MAURITuS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(a); NAMIB. CONST. ch. III, art.
12(1)(d); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(3)(a); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(1); NIGER CONST.
tit. XII, art. 84; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 35(4); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. III (3)(B), § 37(4)(a); PARA.
CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 63; PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 20(2)(f); PHI. CONST. art. IV, § 19;
PORT. CONST. pt. I, §II, ch. I, art. 32(2); QATAR CONST. pt. III, art. 11; ROM. CONST. tit. II, ch.
II, art. 23(8); RWANDA CONST. ch. II, art. 12; ST. CHIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(a); SIERRA
LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 23(4); SOLOM. Is. CONsT. ch. II, § 10(2)(a); SOMAL. CONsT. ch. II, art.
33(2); SPAIN CONST. tit. 1, ch. 11, art. 24(2); SRI LANKA CONST. ch. I, art. 13(5); SUDAN CONST.
pt. I, § 28; SwAZ. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(a); SYRIA CONST. pt. IV, art. 28(1); THAIL. CONST. ch.
III, § 27; TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. 1, pt. I, § 5(2)(f)(i); TUNIS. CONST. ch. 1, art. 12; TUVALU
CONsT. pt. II(3)(a), § 22(3)(a); U.A.E. CONST. pt. 3, art.28; UGANDA CONsT. ch. III, § 15(2)(a);
YEMEN CONST. tit. II, art. 31; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 15; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, § 20(2)(a);
ZIMB. CONST. ch. I, § 18(3)(a).
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accused will not be presumed guilty;"' however, this latter guarantee
is narrower than the presumption of innocence.
6. The Right to a Fair Trial. The array of safeguards which make
up the right to a fair trial serve to protect against the arbitrary
deprivation of the right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of all other
civil, political, economic, and cultural rights.45 The specific elements
which compose procedural fairness in a criminal trial are discussed
infra in parts (a) through (j) in this section.
The right to a fair trial is declared as a general principle of law in
four of the instruments surveyed," while three other instruments
contain a list of the elements of procedural fairness.'47 Provisions
which explicitly guarantee the right to a fair trial or hearing in criminal
cases exist in no less than thirty-eight national constitutions." Other
constitutions contain language which could be construed to generally
guarantee this right.'49 For example, seven national constitutions
guarantee the right to a procedure with all safeguards necessary for a
144. See eg., ETH. CONST. ch. VII, art. 45(1) ("No person criminally accused of violating the
law shall be considered guilty unless it is so determined by a court.")
145. See Symposium, supra note 83.
146. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(1), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 10, at 73; AMCHR,
supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(1), at 4.
147. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 14(3), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 6(3), at 228; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2), at 4.
148. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 15(1); BAH. CONST. ch. I, § 20(1); BARB. CONST. ch.
III, § 18(1); BELIZE CONST. ch. I1, § 6(2); BoL. CONsT. pt. 1, tit. 2, art. 16; BoTs. CONST. ch. II,
§ 10(1); CAMEROON CONST. pmbl.; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(d); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 8(1);
DOM. REP. CONST. tit. 11, § I, art. 8(2)(j); FuI CONST. ch. II, § 11(1); GAM. CONST. ch. Im, §
20(1); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(1); GUY. CONST. pt. II, tit. II, art. 144(1); HUNG. CONST. ch. XII,
§ 57(1); JAM. CONST. ch. Im, § 20(1); KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(1); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. 11, §
10(1); LIBER. CONST. ch. III, § 21(h); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(1); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II,
§ 10(1); NAMm. CONST. ch. 3, art. 12(1)(a); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(2); NIG. CONST. ch. IV,
§ 35(3); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. mI(3)(B), § 37(3); QATAR CONST. pt. Im, art. 11; ST. CHRIS.-
NEVIS CONST. Ch. II, § 10(1); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 23(1); SOLOM. Is. CONST. ch. H,
§ 10(1); SRI LANKA CONST. ch. II, § 13(3); SUDAN CONST. pt. II, § 28; SwAz. CONST. ch. II, §
10(1); TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 5(2)(f)(ii); TUVALU CONST. pt. 2(3)(A), § 22(2);
UGANDA CONST. ch. HI, § 15(1); U.A.E. CONST. pt. 3, art. 28; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. nI, § 20(1);
ZIMB. CONsT. ch. II, § 18(2).
149. For instance, the guarantee of due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution is generally considered to include this concept. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV. Although due process is interpreted to include a fair trial, it was originally
intended to guarantee procedures established by law. See infra text accompanying notes 173-87
for a discussion of due process and procedures established by law. See also BULG. CONST. ch.
2, art. 31(4) (the rights of the accused may not be restricted beyond what is necessary for the
administration of justice).
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defense.15 The right to a defense is related to the right to a fair
trial and is dealt with in conjunction with this right. The "right to
defense," without more, is guaranteed in twenty-one national constitu-
tions,..' but the specific interpretation attached to this rubric is not
evident from the constitutional text alone. It could imply the right to
a fair trial, but also the right to counsel, 52 or even simply the right
to defend oneself.'53 In ten additional constitutions the right to
defense is guaranteed in terms such as "at every level of the proceed-
ings,"' which seems to designate a right to counsel or self-represen-
tation."' The elusiveness of this term is exemplified by the constitu-
tion of Sdo Tom6 and Principe which guarantees the "right of defense
... to accuser and accused."'56 The Banjul Charter guarantees every
individual the "right to have his cause heard,"'57 and includes within
this right the "right to defense, including the right to be defended by
counsel of his choice."'58  The concept of procedural fairness is
otherwise not mentioned, so the language of the Banjul Charter does
little to clarify the definition of the right to defense.
The emergence of concerns about the rights of victims of crime
and about the abuse of power by the state has led the United Nations
150. BRAZIL CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5 (XXXVIII)(a) (right to a full defense); COTE
D'IVOIRE CONST. tit. VII, art. 62; GABON CONST. tit. VII, art. 59; KUWAIT CONST. pt. III, art.
34; LIBYA CONST. ch. 2, art. 31(c); PORT. CONST. § II, ch. I, art. 32(1); TUNIS. CONST. ch. I, art.
12.
151. ALG. CONST. ch. I, art. 142 (right to defense is recognized in general and guaranteed
criminal matters); BULG. CONST. ch. VI, art. 122(1); CAMBODIA CONST. ch. III, art. 35; CAPE
VERDE CONST. tit. 15, § 31(2); CHILE CONST. ch. HI, art. 19(3) (right to legal counsel and
defense); CONGO CONST. tit. VI, art. 111; CUBA CONST. ch. VI, art. 58; EGYPT CONST. pt. IV,
art. 67; GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 12; GUINEA CONST. tit. IX, art. 86; HOND. CONST. tit. InI,
ch. HI, art. 82; KOREA (DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. X, art. 138; LIECH.
CONS?. ch. IV, art. 33; MOZAM. CONST. pt. II, art. 35; MYANMAR CONST. ch. VII, art. 101(g);
NIGER CONST. tit. XII, art. 84; PARA. CONST. ch. V(1), art. 62; ROM. CONST. ch. II, art. 24(1);
S~ko ToMt & PRiNCIPE CONST. ch. III, art. 45; SYRIA CONST. pt. III, art. 28(4); TOGO CONST.
pt. III, art. 28(4).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 219-24.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 231-34.
154. EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 20(20); HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 57(3); IRAQ
CONST. ch. Im, art. 20(b); ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 24; MADAG. CONST. tit. II, art. 42;
NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(4); PERU CONST. ch. IX, art. 233(9); RWANDA CONST. ch.
II, art. 14; SEN. CONST. tit. II, art. 6; VENEZ. CONST. ch. I, art. 60(1).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 219-24. See also the Hungarian Constitution which
provides for a "right to defense at all stages of the procedure. The defense attorney cannot be
held liable for his or her opinions held/statements made during the procedure." HUNG. CONST.
ch. XII, § 57(3). Hungary additionally guarantees the right to a fair trial. Id. ch. XII, § 57(1).
156. SA O TOMA & PRiNCIPE CONST. ch. III, art. 45.
157. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1), at 60.
158. Id. pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(c), at 60.
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to adopt the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime and Abuse of Power,5 9 wherein the victim is given the right
to be represented by counsel in proceedings against the accused.1 °
This is equivalent to the right of the partie civile in civil legal systems,
where the victim is represented by counsel in the criminal proceedings
against the accused because that record forms the basis for subsequent
civil legal actions for compensation of damages.
a. The right to the inadmissibility of certain evidence. In some
states, evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a person's
protected rights will be admissible against him or her in a criminal
trial. 6' Indeed, in many jurisdictions the remedy for such illegiti-
mate actions lies in a right to civil damages or in the prosecution of the
officials who violated the person's rights, while the evidence continues
to be admitted in the criminal proceeding against the person.62 In
other jurisdictions, the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
a person's protected rights is considered necessary to deter the illegal
conduct of officials and to protect the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem.6
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture)
and the AMCHR exclude evidence obtained through torture; the
AMCHR further provides that a "confession of guilt by the accused
shall be valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind."'"
Among the surveyed constitutions, at least seventeen national
constitutions provide for exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
159. See Basic Principles of Justice, supra note 72.
160. See International Protection of Victims, in NOUVELLES tTUDES ItNALES passim (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
161. The "exclusionary rules" for the fruits of illegal searches and seizures in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and the fruits of illegal interrogations in violation of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution were created by the United States Supreme Court, see Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and are still the source of considerable
controversy in American jurisprudence, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting).
162. See, eg., 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (providing a civil cause of action for persons deprived of
rights by those acting under state law authority); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)
overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (holding that illegal search and seizure by police deprives citizen of constitutional rights).
163. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).
164. Convention Against Torture, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 15, at 198; AMCHR, supra note
22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(3), at 4.
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one or more of the following rights: the right to be free from torture
and/or cruel and unusual punishment; the privilege against self-
incrimination; and the right to be free from illegal seizures or illegal
violations of the privacy of communications.'" Similar protections
may exist in many other countries even though their constitutions are
silent on the issue. For example, exclusionary rules may exist as the
result of court decisions, as in the United States, or in legislative
enactments in codes of criminal procedure."
b. The right to an impartial and independent tribunal. The right
to a fair trial axiomatically necessitates that the judges are free from
bias or prejudice in order to act impartially and also be institutionally
and personally independent from political or administrative control
and influence.'6 The right to an impartial and independent tribunal
is protected in five of the instruments surveyed'" and is part of a
cluster of rights relating to the criminal trial in the ICCPR, the
Fundamental Freedoms, the AMCHR, and the Banjul Charter. The
ICCPR, the Fundamental Freedoms, and the AMCHR also specify
that the tribunal must be "established by law,"' 69 which protects
against tribunals of exception established ad hoc to try specific cases.
The assumption is that tribunals of exception, which are usually
165. BRAZiL CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5(LVI); CAMBODIA CONsT. ch. III, art. 35; CAN.
CONST. pt. I, § 24(2); COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 40; CUBA CONST. ch. VI, art. 58; EGYPT
CONST. pt. III, art. 42; ETH. CONST. pt. II, ch. VII, art. 45(4); GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, arts. 9,
24; HOND. CONT. tit. III, ch. II, art. 88; JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 38; KOREA CONST. ch. II, art.
12(7); LIBER. CONST. ch. III, art 21(c); NAMIB. CONST. ch. III, art. 12(1)(C; PARA. CONST. ch.
V, art. 62; PERU CONST. tit. IV, ch. IX, art. 233(12); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4(2), 20; PORT.
CONST. pt. I, § 2, ch. I, art. 32(6).
166. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (prohibiting unreasonable seizures and searches); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/108-1 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (prohibiting search without a warrant, with
some exceptions).
167. See Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 72; Draft Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary and on the Independence of the Legal Profession, NOUVELLES
TUDES PINALEspassim (1982). In certain legal systems, as was the case in the pre-perestroika
Soviet Union, the independence of the court from local government and the ruling party may be
just as much a concern as independence from the traditional arms of law enforcement. See Mark
R. Beissinger, The Party and the Rule of Law, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41, 50-61 (1989);
Fall' S. Nariman, Judges & Lawyers in the USSR: Changing Perceptions, INT'L COMMISSION OF
JuRISTS 53, 54 (1989); John Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet Courts, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 66-69 (1989).
168. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(1), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 10, at 73; Banjul, supra
note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(d), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(1), at 4.
169. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(1), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(1), at 4.
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military or established by executive decision, tend to be politically
motivated and therefore the potential for lack of independence and
impartiality is very high.
At least thirty-two national constitutions provide explicitly that a
criminal trial be before an independent and impartial tribunal.' In
another fifty-four constitutions, general provisions are made for an
independent judiciary or court system without referring directly to the
criminal trial. 7' In some of these countries, where both judges and
lay assessors determine questions of law and fact, provision is made for
the latter's independence as well.'7
2
170. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 15(1); BAH. CONST. ch. I, art. 20(1); BANGL. CONST.
pt. III, art. 35(3); BARB. CONST. ch. III, § 18(1); BELM CONST. ch. H, § 6(2); BOL. CONST. pt.
2, tit. 2, art. 117; BOTS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(1); CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(D); DOMInCA CoNST. ch.
I, § 8(1); Fm CoNsT. ch. II, § 11(l); GAM. CONST. ch. I, § 20(1); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(1);
GUY. CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 144(1); HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 57(1); JAM. CONST. ch. III, §
20(1); JAPAN CONST. ch. I, art. 37; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(1); KIRIBATI CONST. cl. H, §
10(1); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(1); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. H, § 10(1); NAMIB. CONST. ch. I,
art. 12(1)(a); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(2); NIG. CONsT. ch. II, § 18(2)(d); PAPUA N.G. CONST.
pt. III, (3)(B), § 37(3); ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. II, § 10(1); SImRRA LEONE CONST. ch. III,
§ 23(1); SOLOM. IS. CONST. Ch. 11, § 10(1); SPAIN CONST. tit. VI, art. 117; TRIN. & TOBAGO
CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 5(2)(t)(ii); TUVALU CONST. pt. H(1), § 22(2); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, §
15(1); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. I, § 20(1); ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, § 18(2).
171. AFG. CONST. ch. VIII, art. 107; ALB. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, art. 103; ALG. CONST. tit. II,
ch. III, art. 129; ANGOLA CONST. pt. m, ch. VII, art. 76; Aus. CONST. ch. I(B), art. 87(1);
BENIN CONST. ch. VII, art. 109; CAPE VERDE CONST. tit. M, ch. IV, art. 85(2); P.R.C. CONST.
ch. I, § VII, art. 126; COMOROS CONST. pmbl., para. 3; id. at tit. IV, art. 43; COTE D'IVOIRE
CONST. tit. VII, art. 59; CUBA CONST. ch. X, art. 125; EcuADOR CONST. pt. II, tit. I, § I, art.
96; EGYPT CONST. pt. IV, art. 65; i. at pt. V, ch. IV, art. 165; ETH. CONST. pt. III, ch. XIV, art.
104; FIN. CONST. ch. I, art. 2; GABON CONST. tit. VII, art. 57; F.R.G. CONST. ch. IX, art. 97;
GUAT. CONsT. tit. IV, ch. IV, § 1, arts. 204,205; GUINEA CONST. tit. IX, art. 82; HOND. CONST.
tit. V, ch. XII, arts. 303, 311; IRAQ CONST. ch. IV, § IV, art. 60(a); IR. CONST. art. 35(2); ITALY
CONST. pt. II, tit. IV, § 1, arts. 104, 108; JORDAN CONST. ch. VI, § 97; KOREA (DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. X, art. 140; KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. V, art. 101;
KuwArr CONST. pt. IV, ch. V, arts. 162,163; LIECH. CONST. ch. VII(D), art. 99; LIBYA CONST.
ch. II, art. 28; MADAG. CONST. tit. VII, art. 83; MALI CONST. tit. VIII, art. 65; MONACO CONST.
tit. X, art. 88; MONG. CONST. ch. III(IV), art. 49(1); MOROCCO CONST. tit. 7, art. 80; MOZAM.
CONST. pt. III, ch. IV, art. 73; PAK. CONST. pmbl.; PARA. CONST. ch. IX, art. 199; PERU CONST.
tit. IV, ch. IX, arts. 233(2), 242(1); POL. CONST. ch. VII, art. 62; PORT. CONST. pt. III, § V, ch.
I, art. 206; QATAR CONST. pt. IV, ch. V, art. 72; ROM. CONST. tit. III, ch. VI, § 1, art. 123(2);
RWANDA CONST. ch. HI(4), art. 81; SEN. CONST. tit. VII, art. 80; SRI LANKA CONST. pmbl.;
SUDAN CONST. pt. VIII, § 122(2); SwAZ. CONST. ch. II, § 10(1); SYRIA CONST. ch. III, pt. I, arts.
131, 133(1); TAIWAN CONST. ch. VII, art. 80; THAIL CONST. ch. VIII, § 173; TUNIS. CONST. ch.
IV, art. 65; TURK. CONST. pt. I, ch. IX, art. 9; id. at pt. I, ch. I(A), art. 138; VmTNAM CONST.
ch. 10, art. 131; YEMEN CONsT. tit. IV, art. 120.
172. See, eg., ETH. CONST. pt. mI, ch. XIV, art. 104; MADAG. CONST. tit. VII(1), art. 83;
PERU CONST. tit. IV, ch. IX, arts. 233(2), 242(1); VIETNAM CONST. ch. 10, art. 131. The United
States Constitution guarantees in explicit terms only the impartiality of the jury. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
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c. The right to have procedures established by law. This right
ensures that procedures which govern the criminal trial are established
by law prior to the commission of the acts which are the subject of the
adjudication. The right thus parallels two related concepts, that
substantive crimes and punishments must be enacted before the
commission of an offense 3 and that the criminal tribunal must be
"established by law."' 4 The historic precedent for the right to have
procedures established by law is the Magna Carta, which declared that
"no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned.., except.., by the law of
the land."'"5 The common law concept of due process of law, as
understood in the Courts of Common Pleas up until the 1600s, referred
to procedural laws in existence prior to the trial.'76 The right serves
therefore to protect the accused against the establishment of extraordi-
nary tribunals with summary or expedited procedures.
This procedural right is actually a conceptual framework for a
given approach to the conduct of legal proceedings and is guaranteed
in four of the surveyed instruments. Because of its conceptual nature,
it is referred to in different, albeit equivalent, terms. The Universal
Declaration, the ICCPR, and the Fundamental Freedoms provide that
a person must be found guilty "according to law,"'" whereas the
AMCHR uses the phrase "with due guarantees."'7 8 The Banjul
Charter provides that "no one may be deprived of his freedom except
for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law.'
a79
Language guaranteeing procedures established by law in the
criminal process is found in ninety-two national constitutions18°
173. See infra text accompanying notes 263-72.
174. See supra text accompanying note 169.
175. MAGNA CARTA, supra note 83, ch. 39, at 43.
176. On the original meaning of due process of law in the common law of England as it
relates to criminal proceedings, see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNErr, A CONcisE HIsToRY OF THE
COMMON LAw 338 (1936). For the criminal procedure implications, see Bassiouni, supra note
134, 655-76.
177. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(2), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, art.
6(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 11(1), at 73.
178. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8, at 4.
179. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 6, at 60. The Banjul Charter provides protection
against ex post facto convictions and punishments in pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(2), at 60.
180. AmG. CONST. ch. MI, art. 41; ALB. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, art. 101; ALG. CONST. tit. I, ch.
IV, art. 42; ANGOLA CONST. pt. II, art. 23; ANT. & BARB. CONsT. ch. II, § 5(1); ARG. CONST.
pt. I, art. 18; BAH. CONST. ch. III, art. 19(1); BANGL. CONST. pt. III, § 31; BARB. CONST. Ch. III,
§ 13(1); BELG. CONST. tit. HI, arts. 7, 9; BELIZE CONsT. ch. IH, § 5(1); BOTs. CONST. ch. II, §
10(1); BRAz. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 5 (LIV); BULG. CONST. ch. H, arts. 30, 31; CAMBODIA
CONST. ch. I, art. 35; id. at ch. VIII, art. 81; CAMEROON CONST. pmbl., para. 12; CAN. CONST.
pt. I, §§ 7,11; CAPIE VERDE CONsT. tit. I, art. 31(2); CHLE CONST. ch. III, art. 19(3), 19(7)(B);
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Typically the right is designed to protect against a crime or conviction
and all forms of penal sanctions which are not authorized by law and
arrived at in accordance with procedures pre-established by law.'8'
Several constitutions are less explicit and provide only for the
deprivation of freedom when it occurs "under terms of the law,"'2
"in accordance with the law,"'" "by virtue of law,"" 8 as "deter-
mined by law,"''  or pursuant to "guidelines laid down by the
law."' 86 Much of the confusion in terminology may, however, be due
to the difficulty of translating the concept of due process of law in
different languages. The very term "due process of law," as found in
COLOM. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 29; CONGO CONST. tit. II, art. 7; CUBA CONsT. ch. VI, arts. 57,
58; DEN. CONST. pt. VII, art. 71(2); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 3(1); DoM. REP. CONST. tit. II,
§ I, art. 8(2)(J); ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § I, art. 19(17)(E); EGYPT CONST. pt. IV, art. 70;
id. at pt. V, ch. I, arts. 165, 166; Fi CONST. ch. II, § 6(1); GAM. CONST. ch. m, § 15(1); F.R.G.
CONST. Ch. IX, art. 103(1); GREECE CONsT. pt. II, arts. 5(3), 6; GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 3(1);
GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 6; GuY. CONST. pt. II, tit. I, art. 139(1); HOND. CONST. tit. IV,
ch. I, art. 182; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 55(1); INDIA CONST. pt. m, art. 21; IRAQ CONST. ch. m,
art. 21(B); IR. CONST. art. 38(1); ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 13; JAM. CONST. ch. Ill, § 15(1);
JAPAN CONST. ch. M, art. 31; JORDAN CONST. ch. II, § 8; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(1);
KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II, arts. 12(1), 27(1); KUWAIT
CONST. pt. III, art. 32; LIBER. CONST. ch. I, art. 20(A); LUX. CONST. ch. II, arts. 12,14; MADAG.
CONST. tit. VI, art. 42; MALAY. CONST. pt. II, art. 5(1); MALI CONST. tit. II, art. 8; MALTA
CONST. ch. IV, § 34(1); MARTUS CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 14;
MONACO CONsT. tit. III, arts. 19,20; MOROCCO CONST. tit. I, art. 10; MOzAM. CONST. pt. II, art.
35; NAMIB. CONST. ch. m, art. 12(1)(D); NAURU CONST. pt. II, §§ 5(1), 10(3)(A); NEPAL CONST.
pt. III, § 11(1); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 33; NIGER. CONST. tit. XII, art. 84; NIG. CONST.
ch. IV, § 34(1); NOR. CONST. pt. E, art. 94; PAK. CONST. pt. I, art. 4(2)(A); id. at pt. II, art. 9;
PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. m (3)(B), § 37(3); PARA. CONST. ch. V, art. 61 (trial based upon a law
enacted prior to commission); PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(20); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3,19;
RoM. CONST. tit. II, ch. II, art. 23; ST. CHRIs.-NEvis CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); SIERRA LEONE
CONST. ch. m, § 17(1); SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 9(1); SoLOM. Is. CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); SOMAL.
CONST. ch. II, art. 26(2); SPAIN CONST. ch. I, § 1, art. 17(1); SRI LANKA CONST. ch. III, § 13(4);
SUDAN CONST. pt. m, § 21; SuRIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 16(2); SWAz. CONsT. ch. II, § 5(1);
TAIWAN CONST. ch. I, art. 8; TANz. CONST. § 3, 13(6)(a); TONGA CONST. pt. I, §§ 10, 14; TRN.
& TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 4(a); TuNIS CONST. ch. I, art. 12; U.A.E. CONST. pt. III, art. 26;
UGANDA CONST. ch. II, art. 10(1); U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; VENEZ. CONST. tit. III, ch. III,
art. 60(5); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. m, art. 15(1); ZIMB. CONST. ch. VI, § 18(3)(D).
181. See, eg., ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); BAH. CONST. ch. M, art. 19(1); DOMINICA
CONST. ch. I, § 3(1); FIJI CONST. ch. II, § 6(1); GAM. CONST. ch. III, art. 15(1); GREN. CONST.
ch. I, § 3(1); GUY. CONsT. pt. II, tit. I, art. 139(1); JAM. CONST. ch. m, § 15(1); KIRIBATI CONST.
ch. II, § 5(1); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 34(1); MAURITUS CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS
CONST. ch. II, § 5(1); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 17(1); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. U1, § 5(1).
182. See, e.g., ANGOLA CONST. pt. II, art. 23.
183. See, eg., F.R.G. CONST. ch. IX, art. 103(1); SING. CONST. pt. IV, art. 9(1); SUDAN
CONST. pt. M, § 21.
184. See, eg., KUWAIT CONST. pt. III, art. 32; MALI CONST. tit. U, art. 8.
185. See, eg., SURIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 16(2).
186. See, eg., TANZ. CONST. § 3, art. 15(2)(a).
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion is not, as stated earlier, an explicit right but rather a conceptual
approach to the conduct of criminal proceedings.'7 Thus, more than
any other guarantee or right discussed herein, it is of such a level of
generality that its concordance in comparative research can be
achieved by a particularized methodology. Such a methodology would
necessarily start by identifying the specific rights (as is done here, but
with more particularity) and then tracing the application of these
rights, essentially through judicial decisions, in the different families of
legal systems. Because the Anglo-American adversary-accusatory
model is different from the inquisitorial-based model, and both are
different from the Islamic model,"s the occurence, application, and
effectiveness of these rights will differ in the various systems.
d. The right to a speedy trial. This right is part of the concept of
due process, but it has also been recognized as a separate, indentifiable
right; therefore, it is discussed separately, infra.
e. The right to a public hearing. The right to a public hearing is
designed to protect the accused from secret trials, as well as to foster
public trust in the administration of justice by opening the courts and
legal proceedings to public scrutiny. This right is guaranteed in four
of the surveyed instruments."9 Although the right is expressed
unconditionally in the Universal Declaration"g and the Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, 9' it is subject to certain
exceptions. The AMCHR provides for a general exception "as may
be necessary to protect the interests of justice."'" The ICCPR and
the Fundamental Freedoms, on the other hand, enumerate specific
exceptions:
187. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
'188. See THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR (M. Cherif Bassiouni & V.M.
Savitski eds., 1979); THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982);
vf. CherifBassiouni,A Survey of the Major Criminal Justice Systems in the World, in HANDBOOK
OF CRIMINOLOGY 527 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974).
' 189. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(1), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 10, at 73; AMCHR,
supra note 22, pt. I, ch. 11, art. 8(5), at 4.
190. Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 10, at 73.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
192. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(5), at 4.
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[T]he press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.1"'
The right to a public hearing is guaranteed in no less than
seventy-two of the national constitutions surveyed, 94 often with the
explicit exceptions found in the Fundamental Freedoms and the
ICCPR.95 In many constitutions the provision guaranteeing public
hearings is not among the list of "citizen's rights and guarantees," but
is included in the section of the constitution dealing with the judiciary,
193. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § 1, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; see also
ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. MI, art. 14(1), at 54 (providing for the same exceptions).
194. AFG. CONST. ch. VIII, art. 113; ALE. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, art. 102; ANT. & BARB.
CONST. ch. II, § 15(9); Aus. CO NST. ch. III, art. 90; BANGL. CONST. pt. I, § 35 (3); BARB.
CONST. ch. III, § 18(9); BELG. CONS?. tit. III, ch. I, art. 96; BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(8); BENIN
CONST. ch. VII, art. 113; BOTs. CONST. ch. II, § 10(10); BULG. CONST. ch. VI, art. 121(3);
CAMBODIA CONST. ch. VIII, art. 83; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(D); P.R.C. CONST. ch. III, §VII, art.
125; COMOROS CONST. tit. IV, art. 43; DEN. CONST. pt. VI, § 65(1); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, §
8(10); DoM. REP. CONST. tit. II, § I, art. 8(2)0); ECUADOR CONST. pt. II, tit. I, § I, art. 95;
EGYPT CONST. pt. V, ch. IV, art. 169; EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. VIII, ch. IV, art. 144; ETH. CONST.
ch. XIV, art. 106; Fn CONST. ch. H, § 11(9); GAM. CONsT. ch. Im, § 20(9); GREN. CONST. ch. I,
§ 8(9); GUINEA CONST. tit. IX, art. 85; GuY. CONST. pt. II, tit. I, art. 144(9); HUNG. CONS?. ch.
XII, § 57(1); IRAQ CONsT. ch. III, art. 20(c); IR. CONST. art. 34(1); JAM. CONST. ch. In, § 20(3);
JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 37; id. at ch. VI, art. 82; JORDAN CONST. ch. VI, § 101(ii); KENYA
CONST. ch. V, § 77(10); KIRIBATI CONS. ch. II, § 10 (9); KOREA (DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. X, art. 138; KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONsT. ch. H, art. 27 (3); KUwArr
CONST. pt. IV, ch. V, art. 165; Lux. CONST. ch. VI, art. 88; MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(3);
MAuRrnus CONST. ch. II, § 10(9); MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 20 (VI); MYANMAR CONST. ch.
VII, art. 101(F); NAMiB. CONST. ch. I, art. 12(1)(a); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(10); NETH.
CONST. cl. VI, art. 121; NIcAR. CONS. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(10); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 35(12);
PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. II (3)(B), § 37(12); PERU CONST. tit. IV, ch. IX, art. 233(3); Pi.
CONST. art. IV (19); PORT. CONST. pt. I, § V, ch. I, art. 209; ROM. CONST. tit. II, ch. VI, § 1,
art. 126; RWANDA CONST. ch. III(4), art. 88; ST. CHRIS.-NEviS CONST. ch. II, § 10(10); SIERRA
LEONE CONST. ch. I, § 22(3); SOLOM. Is. CONST. ch. II, § 10(9); SOMAL. CONST. ch. IV, § 2, art.
99(1); SPAIN CONST. tit. VII, art. 120(1); SRI LANKA CONST. ch. XV, § 106(1); SURiN. CONS?. ch.
XV, § 2, art. 136(2); SWAZ. CONST. ch. II, § 10(10); SWED. CONST. ch. II, art. 11; TURK. CONST.
pt. III, § (D), art. 141; TUVALU CONST. pt. II(3)(A), § 22(12); UGANDA CONST. ch. III, § 15(10);
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; VIETNAM CONST. ch. 10, art. 133; YEMEN CONST. tit. IV, art. 125; ZAIRE
CONST. tit. II, art. 16; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, § 20(10); ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, § 18(10).
195. See, eg., JORDAN CONST. ch. VI, § 101(ii); NAMIB. CONST. ch. I, art. 12(1)(A); NICAR.
CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(10); NIG. CONS?. ch. IV, § 35(12); RWANDA CONST. ch. I1(4), art.
88.
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and refers to all court proceedings, not just those involving criminal
cases.
196
The right to a public hearing, unlike other procedural due process
rights, involves more than the interests of the defendant. There are
additional components such as the public's right to know and the
integrity of the judicial process. Thus, a careful balancing of these
sometimes competing interests requires specific guidelines for court
proceedings which cannot be found in constitutions.' 97
f. The right to be informed of the charges. The right to be
informed of the charges technically applies to notice of criminal
charges already proferred by the accusatory body,9' and is protected
in four of the surveyed instruments.'" The ICCPR, the Fundamental
Freedoms, the AMCHR, and the BOP have further extended the right
of notice to the stage of detention and require notice of the cause of
arrest as well. Thus, the right as articulated in these instruments is
designed to protect against arbitrary arrests and prosecutions and to
enable the arrested or accused person to prepare a defense to the
charge or an argument against his or her detention.' This right is
essential to the effective preparation of a defense in any criminal case.
It is even more important that notice of the charges be made in a
timely manner to allow for sufficient preparation of the defense, and
that the charges not be substantially altered shortly before trial
commences in order to avoid undue surprise and prejudice to the
defense. It is equally important that criminal charges not be changed
after a trial commences if the change increases the severity of the
charge or alters its nature. The severity of the charge can be
decreased unless it would be so prejudicial to the defendant that he or
she could not conduct an effective defense. These technicalities are
196. See; e.g., AM. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, art. 102; Aus. CONST. ch. III, art. 90; COMOROS
CoNST. tit. IV, art. 43, ECUADOR CONST. pt. II, tit. III, § I, art. 95.
197. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1992) (outlining standards of conduct for legal professionals
during criminal cases).
198. See eg., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (one must be informed of the "nature and cause of the
accusation").
199. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, arts. 9(2), 14(3)(a), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 22, § 1, arts. 5(2), 6(3)(a), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226, 228; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. 1, art.
6, at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, arts. 7(4), 8(2)(b), at 3, 4.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 106-17 (discussing the right to be free from arbitrary
arrest and detention); supra text accompanying notes 151-58 (discussing the right to defense).
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not covered by constitutional tests and are usually found in codes of
criminal procedure and in judicial decisions.
The right to be informed of the charges is protected in at least
forty-seven national constitutions."° In many of these, the right to
notice also applies at the time of detention as to the cause of arrest,
although this is not necessarily binding as to subsequent formal charges
for which the defendant may stand trial.
g. The right to equality of arms. The right to equality of arms
is fundamental to the adversarial nature of modem criminal proceed-
ings. In earlier inquisitorial systems, defense counsel often was not
allowed to participate in the actual trial. The human rights instru-
ments examined evince a definite move towards adversarial criminal
procedures and away from the inquisitorial mode.2° The right to
equality of arms is guaranteed in three of the instruments surveyed,
namely the ICCPR, the AMCHR, and the Fundamental Freedoms.'
Both the ICCPR and the Fundamental Freedoms express the right to
equality of arms' in conjunction with the rights of confrontation
and compulsory process.' ° Five of the instruments surveyed also
201. ANT. & BARB. CONsT. ch. 11, § 15(2)(B); BAH. CONST. ch. H, art. 20(2)(B); BANGL
CONST. pt. III, § 33 (1); BARB. CONST. ch. I, § 18(2)(B); BELZE CONST. ch. 11, § 6(3)(B); BOiS.
CONST. ch. 11, § 10(2)(B); CAN. CONST. pt. I, §§ 10(A), 11(A); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(B);
ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. 11, § 1, art. 19(17)(i); EGYPT CONsT. pt. IV, art. 71; FIM CONST. ch.
11, § 11(2)(B); GAM. CONST. ch. HI, § 20(2)(B); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(B); Guy. CONST. pt.
II, tit. I, art. 144(2)(B); JAM. CONST. ch. m, § 20(6)(A); KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(2)(B);
KmBATI CONST. ch. H1, § 10(2)(B); LINER. CONST. ch. I, art. 21(c); MALAY. CONST. pt. II, art.
5(3); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(A); MAURUS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(B); MEX. CONST. tit.
I, ch. I, ar. 20 (111); NAURU CONST. pt. H1, § 10(3)(B); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, oh. I, art. 33(2)(1);
NIG. CONST. oh. IV, § 35(5)(A); PAK. CONsT. pt. H1, ch. I, art. 10(1); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. HI
(3)(B), § 37(4)(B); PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(20)(H); PHIL. CONST. art. IV (19); PORT.
CONST. pt. I, § 11, ch. I, art. 27(4); ROM. CONST. tit. 11, oh. II, § 1, art. 23(5); ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS
CONST. oh. 1, § 10(2)(B); SIERRA LEONE CONST. oh. HI, § 17(2); SING. CONST. pt. IV, § 9(3);
SOLOM. IS. CONST. oh. II, § 10(2)(B); SOMAL CONST. oh. 11, § 26(4); SPAIN CONST. tiL I, ch. 11,
arts. 17(3), 24(2); SWAZ. CONsT. oh. HI, §§ 5(2), 10(2)(B); TONGA CONsT. pt. I, § 11; TRIN. &
TOBAGO CONST. oh. I, pt. I, § 5(2)(o)(i); TURK. CONST. pt. II, ch. 11(3), art. 19; TUVALU CONST.
pt. II(3)(A), § 22(3)(B); UGANDA CONST. ch. II, § 15(2)(B); U.S. CONST. amend. VI; VENEz.
CONST. oh. 11, art. 60(5); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. I, § 20(2)(B); ZnMB. CONST. ch. H, § 18(3)(B).
202. See supra note 141.
203. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(3)(e), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ 1, art. 6(3)(d), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(f), at 4.
204. "To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him."
ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(3)(e), at 54; see Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § 1,
art. 6(3)(d), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 (using approximately the same language).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 210-13 (discussing the right to compulsory process).
1993]
278 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:235
require adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defense.'
The right to equality of arms,2° as expressed in the ICCPR and
the Fundamental Freedoms, is also noted in more than twenty-seven
national constitutions.' In these constitutions, the specific language
of the right incorporates the guarantee in a cluster of rights, which also
include the right to adequate time and facilities for preparation of the
defense. In large part it can be said that this right is the European
counterpart to the common law right of due process. In an inquisitori-
al system, the need to "equalize arms" between defense and prosecu-
tion is critical, while the common law's due process approach
inherently presupposes that both sides will be given equality in
procedural opportunities to advocate their respective opposing
positions. However, if in the due process system the scales of
relatively equal procedural opportunities tip too much against the
defense, then the right of equality of arms can be invoked to redress
such an imbalance.
h. The right to assistance of counsel This right is part of the due
process cluster of rights, but like the right to a speedy trial, it has been
recognized as a separate fundamental right. Consequently, it is
discussed separately, infra.
i. The right to compulsory process. The right to compulsory
process guarantees the help of the court in obtaining the testimony of
206. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(3)(b), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ 1, art. 6(3)(b), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; BOP, supra note 22, prine. 18, at 299; Banjul, supra note
22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(c), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(c), (d), at 4.
207. This phrase itself appears in none of the instruments or national constitutions examined.
208. ANT. & BARB. CONsT. oh. II, § 15(2)(e); BAH. CONsT. ch. III, § 20(2)(e); BARB. CONST.
oh. I, § 18(2)(e); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(3)(E); BOTs. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); DOMINICA
CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(e); Fm CONST. oh. 1I, § 11(2)(e); GAM. CONST. Ch. I, § 202(e); GREN.
CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(e); GuY. CONST. pt. II, tit. I, art. 144(2)(e); JAM. CONST. ch. III, § 20 (6)(d);
JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 37; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(2)(e); KIRIBAT CONST. Ch. II, §
10(2)(e); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(d); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); NAURU
CONST. pt. II, § 10(3)(f); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 35(5)(d); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. III(3)(B), §
37(4)(O; ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 23(5)(D);
SOLOM. Is. CoNsT. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); SWAZ. CONST. ch. II, §§ 10(2)(c, e); TUVALU CONST. pt.
II(3)(A), § 22(3)(f)(ii); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, § 15(2)(e); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, § 20(2)(e);
ZhiB. CONST. ch. H, § 18(3)(e).
209. See, eg., ANT. & BARB. CONST. oh. II, § 15(2)(e); ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § 1,
art. 19(17)(e); JAPAN CONST. ch. I, art. 37; LINER. CONST. oh. III, art. 21(h); MEX. CONST. tit.
I, ch. I, art. 20(V); NAmIB. CONST. ch. 3, art. 12(1)(e); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
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witnesses and the production of other evidence, and as such is
integrally related to the concept of equality of arms. This right is
protected in three of the human rights instruments examined21° and
in at least thirty-four national constitutions.21 However, this right
is largely neglected even though its importance to a defense is
immeasurable. This is particularly so in cases where the evidence may
be located in foreign countries. Governments have the benefit of
mutual legal assistance treaties,2 2 but individuals do not. Private
citizens are thus unable to secure evidence needed for their de-
fense213 and are placed in a position which clearly violates the
concept of equality of arms as discussed above.
j. The right to be tried in one's own presence. The right to be
present at one's own trial is an important element of the right to
defend oneself against criminal charges. It is also related to the
assumption that the ability of the accused to face his or her judge and
accusers adds a dimension of credibility to the proceedings and
enhances the ascertainment of the truth. Of the instruments surveyed,
the right is guaranteed only by the ICCPR." 4 Although nearly
twenty-five national constitutions guarantee the right,215 there are
210. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. Ill, art. 14(3)(c), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ 1, art. 6(3)(d), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(f), at 4.
211. The subsection of each of the twenty-seven constitutions which guarantees equality of
arms also guarantees the right of compulsory process. See supra note 208. Seven additional
constitutions guarantee this right separately. ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. II, § 1, art. 19(17)(e);
JAPAN CONST. ch. I, art. 37; LIER. CONST. ch. III, art. 21(h); MEx. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art.
20(V); NAMIB. CONST. ch. I, art. 12(1)(d) (guaranteeing only opportunity to call witnesses);
PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
212. See 2 EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION IN CRBNAL MATrERS 7-149 (Ekkehart
Millier-Rappard & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 2d ed. 1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy
Considerations on Inter-state Cooperation in Criminal Matters, in PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Albin Esser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992).
213. For the European system, see Ekkehart Mifiler-Rappard, The European State, in 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 95 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986). For the United States
system, see Alan Ellis and Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra, at 151.
214. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. II, art. 14(3)(d), at 54.
215. ALB. CONST. pt. I, ch. II, art. 56; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 15(2); BAH. CONST.
ch. M, § 20(2); BARB. CONST. ch. 1I, § 18(2); BELIZE CONST. ch. 11, § 6(3); BOTS. CONST. ch.
11, § 10(2); DOMrNICA CONST. ch. I, § 8(2); EQ. GUiNEA CONsT. tit. I, ch. IV, art. 38; Fin
CONST. ch. II, § 11(2); GAM. CONST. ch. I, § 20(2); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2); GUY. CONsr.
pt. 2, tit. 1, art. 144(2); KENYA CONsT. ch. V, § 77(2); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, § 10(2); MALTA
CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6); MAURrUS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2); NAURU CONT. pt. II, art. 10(3);
PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. I, div. 3(B), art. 37(5); ST. CHRIS.-NEviS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2); SOLOM.
Is. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2); SWAZ. CONT. ch. II, § 10(2); TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. 3(A), § 22(4);
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exceptions for when the accused flees the jurisdiction during trial or
after having been given notice of the charge, or when the conduct
of the accused renders the continuance of the proceedings in his or her
presence impossible.2' This right is also designed in part to avoid
trial in absentia which is, in many respects, inherently unfair because
it does not allow a defendant to effectively participate in the trial and
present an adequate defense. Trials in absentia are prohibited by the
ICCPR."8 Some countries have found a way around the prohibition
by having the in absentia conviction be subject to a trial de novo on
the facts whenever an accused found guilty in absentia has been
apprehended.
7. The Right to Assistance of Counsel. Representation by counsel
at each important stage of criminal proceedings is a fundamental right
of the defense and is paramount to the concept of due process. One
of the assumptions on which this right is based is that the presence of
effective counsel will deter and prevent abuses against the person
arrested, charged, or prosecuted. Furthermore, having counsel present
ensures that due process shall be followed. The general right to the
assistance of counsel contains several components which are
surveyed separately in this section. It is important to note that merely
guaranteeing the right to counsel does not ensure that this right will be
afforded at all stages of the criminal process, from detention through
appeal.2"9 The right to counsel is guaranteed in six of the instru-
ments examined.' In addition, the ICCPR and the BOP require
that an accused be informed of the right to counsel."1
More than sixty-five national constitutions guarantee the right to
counsel in criminal proceedings. In some the right only exists with
respect to trial proceedings, while in other constitutions the right to
UGANDA CONST. ch. I, art. 15(2); ZAMBIA CoNsr. pt. II, art. 20(2); ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, §
18(3).
216. See, &g., ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. H1, § 15(2)(i).
217. See, eg., id. § 15(2)(ii); BAH. CONST. ch. III, § 20(2).
218. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(d), at 54.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 237-44.
220. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. II, art. 14(3)(b), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ 1, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 17, at 299; SMRTP, supra note
22, pt. II, art. 93, at 73; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(I)(c), at 60; AMCHR, supra note
22, pt. I, ch. 1I, art. 8(2)(d), at 4.
221. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. Il, art. 14(3)(d), at 54; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 17(l), at
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counsel exists at both detention and trial.2  As stated above, the
general right to a defense, when enunciated in a given constitution,
may not explicitly guarantee the assistance of counsel at all stages of
the trial and to all persons, particularly indigents, although in some
constitutions the right to assistance of counsel is implicit in the right
to a defense.' Indeed, the wording of Article 7(1)(c) of the Banjul
Charter, which provides for "the right to defense, including the right
to be defended by counsel.. ." is evocative of just such an interpre-
tation.224
a. The right to counsel of one's choice. The ICCPR, the
Fundamental Freedoms, the AMCHR, and the Banjul Charter extend
the guarantee of counsel to include the right to counsel of one's own
choosing. Such a choice presumably allows an effective defense by
222. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. 1I, §§ 15(2)(d), 5(3); BAH. CONS?. ch. I, §§ 19(2), 19(5)(a),
20(2)(d); BANGL CONST. pt. MI, § 33(1); BARB. CONST. ch. I, §§ 13(2), (6)(e); BELIZ CONST.
ch. 1I, § 5(2)(f); BOL CONST. pt. 1, tit. 2, art. 16; BorS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); BRAZ. CONST.
art. 5 (LXm); BULG. CONST. ch. 2, arts. 30(4), 56; CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 10(6); CHILE CoNST. ch.
III, § 19(3); ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. I, § I, art. 19 (17)(e) (only at trial); EGYPT CoNST. pt.
IV, art. 67 (only at trial); ETH. CONST. pt. 1, ch. VII, art. 45(3); FiJI CONST. ch. H, §§ 6(3),
11(2)(d); GAM. CONST. ch. M, § 20(2)(d); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(d); GUAT. CONST. tit. II,
ch. I, arts. 14, 19(c); GuY. CONST. pt. II, tit. 1, arts. 139(3), 144(2)(d); HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, §
57(3); INDIA CONST. pt. III, art. 22(1); ITALY CONST. art. 24; JAM. CONST. ch. m, § 20(6)(c);
JAPAN CONST. ch. 1, art. 34; KENYA CONST. ch. IV, pt. 3, §77(2)(d); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. 1, §
10(2)(d); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. 1, art. 12(4); LIBER. CONST. ch. I, art. 21(h)(i);
MALAY. CONST. pt. 1, art. 5(3); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(c); MARmus CONST. ch. HI, §
10(2)(d); MEx. CONST. ch. I, art. 20(IX); NAMIB. CONST. ch. I, art. 12(1)(e); NAURU CONST.
pt. II, § 10(3)(e); NEPAL CONST. pt. II, § 14(5); N-H. CONST. ch. I, art. 18(1); NICAR. CONST.
tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(4); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, §§ 34(2), 35(5)(c) (before interrogation and trial);
PAK. CONS?. pt. II, ch. I, art. 10(1); PAPUA N.G. CONS?. pt. I, div. 3, arts. 37(4)(e), 42(2)(b);
PERU CONST. tit. i, ch. I, art. 2(20)(h); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; POL. CONST. ch. 7, art. 63(2);
PORT. CONST. pt. I, § HI, ch. I, art. 32(3); QATAR CONST. pt. I, art. 11 (only at trial); ROM.
CON S. ch. II, art. 24(1)(2) (only at trial); ST. CRIuST.-NEviS CONST. ch. HI, §§ 5(2), 10(2)(d); SAO
TOMP & PRINCIPE CONST. ch. III, art. 45; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. I, § 17(2)(b); SING.
CONST. pt. IV, § 9(3); SOLOM. IS. CONS?. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); SOMAL. CONST. ch. HI, art. 32(2) (only
at trial); SPAIN CONST. ch. II, arts. 17(3), 24(2); SRI LANKA CONST. ch. III, art. 13(3) (only at
trial); SUDAN CONST. pt. I, § 28 (only at trial); SURIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 12(1) (only at trial);
SwAZ. CONST. ch. HI, § 10(2)(d); TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 5(2)(c)(ii); TUVALU
CONST. pt. HI, div. 3, § 22(3)(e) (only at trial); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, § 15(2)(d) (only at trial);
U.A.E. CONS?. pt. 1, art. 28; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ZAIRE CONST. tit. H, art. 16; ZAMBIA
CONST. pt. M, art. 20(2)(d); ZIMB. CONST. ch. I, §§ 13(3), 18(3)(d).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 145-60. Note that some constitutions guarantee both
the right to counsel and to a defense. See, eg., NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(4), (5).
224. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(c), at 60.
225. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 14(3)(d), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ I, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(c), at 60;
AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. 1I, art. 8(2)(d), at 4.
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the accused, increases fairness in the proceedings, and promotes the
public's confidence in the criminal justice system. Of the constitutions
surveyed, forty-three guarantee the right to counsel of one's choos-
ing. 6 Some extend the right to allow suspects to choose counsel
immediately after detentionm This right has only been partially
extended to indigents who are financially unable to retain their own
counsel.' Many legal systems place the duty of assistance of
counsel on the legal profession as a whole. Consequently, indigent
defendants are represented by counsel appointed by the bar or by the
bench, resulting in weak legal representation. In addition, this method
certainly does not afford a person counsel of his or her own choosing.
b. The right to appointment of counsel in case of indigency.
While an indigent accused may not have recourse to the counsel of his
or her choice, the appointment of counsel is, at a minimum, necessary
under the right to defense, the right to counsel, the right to a fair trial,
and the right to equal protection under the law. This necessity is
highlighted by the overwhelming number of criminal defendants who
are unable to afford counsel. The ICCPR, the Fundamental Freedoms,
the AMCHR, and the BOP all guarantee appointed counsel for the
indigent, 9 as do twenty-four national constitutionsm '
226. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, §§ 5(3), 15(2)(d); BAH. CONST. ch. Il, §§ 19(2), 20(2)(d);
BANGL. CONST. pt. MI, § 33(1); BARB. CONST. ch. Il, §§ 13(2), 13(6)(e), 18(2)(d); BELIZE
CONsT. ch. II, §§ 5(2)(b), 6(3)(d); BoiS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, §
8(2)(d); Fm CONS. ch. II, §§ 6(3), 11(2)(d); GAm. CONSr. ch. I, § 20(2)(d); GREN. CONST. ch.
I, § 8(2)(d); GuY. CONST. pt. 2, tit. 1, arts. 139(3), 144(2)(d); INDIA CONST. pt. I1, art. 22(1);
JAM. CoNsT. ch. III, § 20(6)(c); KENYA CONST. ch. IV, pt. 3, § 77(2)(d); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II,
§ 10(2)(d); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONST. ch. II, art. 12(4); LIBER. CONST. ch. III, art. 21(c), (h),
(i); MALAY. CONST. pt. II, art. 5(3); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(c); MAURrTus CONsT. ch.
II, §§ 5(3), 5(4)(d), 10(2)(d); MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 20(IX); NAMIB. CONST. ch. 3, art.
12(1)(e); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(3)(e); NEPAL CONST. pt. 3, § 14(5); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, §
34(2); PAK. CONST. pt. I, ch. 1, art. 10(1); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. H, div. 3(c), arts. 37(4)(e),
42(2)(b); PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(20)(h); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; PORT. CONST. pt. I,
§ II, ch. I, art. 32(3); RoM. CoNsT. tit. II, ch. II, art. 24(1), (2); ST. CHRIsT.-NEvis ch. II, §§ 5(2),
10(2)(d); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. I, § 17(2)(b); SING. CONST. pt. IV, § 9(3); SOLOM. IS.
CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); SUDAN CONST. pt. 1H, § 28; TRIN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. I, §
5(2)(c)(ii); TUvALU CONST. pt. II, div. 3(A), § 22(3)(e); UGANDA CONST. ch. 1I, § 15(2)(d);
U.A.E. CONST. pt. M, art. 28; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 16; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. H, art. 20(2)(d);
ZIMB. CONST. ch. Il, §§ 13(3), 18(3)(d).
227. See, e.g., GUY. CONST. pt. 2, tit. 1, art. 139(1) ("[A]ny person who is arrested or detained
... shall be permitted... to retain and instruct without delay a legal adviser of his own choice
228. See infra text accompanying notes 229-30.
229. ICCPR, supri note 4, pt. II, art. 14(3)(d), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ 1, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 17(2), at 299; AMCHR, supra
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c. The right to self-representation. The right to self-representa-
tion complements the right to counsel and is not meant as a substitute
thereof This right assures the accused of the right to participate in his
or her defense, including directing the defense, rejecting appointed
counsel, and conducting his or her own defense under certain
circumstances. The right to self-representation is guaranteed by the
ICCPR, the Fundamental Freedoms, the AMCHR,2' and possibly
the Banjul Charter. 32 This right is also guaranteed in thirty-three of
the national constitutions surveyed.33 In addition, more than sixty-
five constitutions contain language pertaining to the right of defense
which may also be intended to encompass the right to self-representa-
tion. 4  Because representation of counsel is not only a matter of
interest to the accused, but is also paramount to due process of the law
and to the integrity of the judicial process, the court must ensure that
self-representation is adequate and effective. Thus the court should
appoint professional counsel to supplement self-representation;
conversely, whenever it is in the best interest of justice and in the
interest of adequate and effective representation of the accused, the
note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(e), at 4.
230. CHILE CONST. ch. M, art. 19(3); ECUADOR CONsT. pt. II, tit. M, § III, art. 107; EGYPT
CONsT. pt. IV, art. 69; ETH. CONST. pt. II, ch. VII, art. 45(3); FM CONST. ch. II, § 11(2)(d); INDIA
CONST. pt. IV, art. 39A; ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 24; JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 37; KOREA
CONST. ch. II, art. 12(4); LIBER. CONST. ch. I, art 21(i); MAURmUS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d);
NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(3)(e); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(5); PAPUA N.G. CONST.
pt I, div. 3, §C, arts. 37(4)(e), 42(2)(b); PARA. CONST. ch. IX, art. 204; PERU CoNST. tit. IV,
ch. IX, art. 233(9); PHIL. CONsT. art. IV, § 23; POL CONST. ch. VII, art. 63; PORT. CONST. pt. I,
§ I, art. 20(1); RoM. CONST. it. 1, ch. II, art. 24(2); SOMAL. CoNsT. ch. 2, art. 32(3); SPAIN
CONST. ch. II, art. 24(2); SURIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 12(2); THAIL CONST. ch. III, § 29.
231. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(3)(d), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ I, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(d), at 4.
232. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. 1, ch. 1, art. 7(1)(c), at 60.
233. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 15(2)(d); BAH. CONST. ch. I, § 20(2)(d); BARB. CONST.
ch. III, § 18(2)(d); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(3)(d); BOTS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); CAMBODIA
CONST. ch. I, art. 35; DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(d); ETH. CONST. pt. II, ch. VII, art. 45(3);
Flui CONST. ch. H, § 11(2)(d); GAM. CONST. ch. I, § 20(2)(d); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(d);
JAM. CONST. ch. I, § 20(6)(c); KENYA CONST. ch. IV, pt. 3, § 77(2)(d); KIRIBATI CONST. ch II,
§ 10(2)(d); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(c); MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); MEX. CONST.
tit. I, ch. I, art. 20(IX); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(3)(e); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 35(5)(c); PAPUA
N.G. CONST. pt. I, div. 3(c), art. 37(4)(e); PmL CONST. art. IV, § 19; QATAR CONST. pt. III,
art. 11; ST. CHRiST.-NEvIs CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d); SRI
LANKA CONsT. ch. III, art. 13(3); SUDAN CONST. pt. III, § 28; SWAz. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(d);
TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. 3(A), § 22(3)(A); UGANDA CONST. ch. III, § 15(2)(d); VIETNAM
CONST. ch. 10, art. 133; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 16; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, art. 20(2)(d); ZmB.
CONST. ch. Im, § 18(3)(d).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 145-58 (discussing the right to a fair trial); supra text
accompanying notes 219-24 (discussing the right to assistance of counsel).
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court should disallow self-representation and appoint professional
counsel.
d. The right to assistance of an interpreter. The right to
assistance of an interpreter assures the effectiveness of the right to a
fair trial and the right to counsel. Assistance is often necessary to
ensure comprehension of proceedings and accusatory documents. The
right to an interpreter paid by the court is guaranteed by four of the
instruments examined,' 5 and is guaranteed in no less than thirty-two
national constitutions 6
e. The right to the presence of counsel during all stages of the
proceedings. None of the instruments examined specifically guarantee
the right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. The ICCPR
guarantees the accused the right to counsel "in the determination of
any criminal charge against him."'  The Fundamental Freedoms
provides counsel to "everyone charged with a criminal offense,"' 38
and the AMCHR guarantees counsel "during the proceedings" to
those "accused of a serious crime." '  The right to counsel in the
Banjul Charter is comprised within the "right to have his cause
heard." The BOP guarantees the right to counsel during the
preliminary investigation period.4 1 The phraseology in each of the
235. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. III, art. 14(3)(f), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ I, art. 6(3)(e), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; SMRTP, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 30(3), at 69; AMCHR,
supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(a), at 4.
236. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 15(2)(f; BAH. CONST. ch. III, § 20(2)(f); BARB. CONST.
ch. I, § 18(2)(f); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(3)(f); BOTs. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(f); CAN. CONST.
pt. I, §14; DOMnINCA CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(f); ETH. CONST. pt. III, ch. XIV, art. 105; Fiji CONST.
ch. H1, § 11(2)(f); GAM. CONST. ch. M, § 20(2)(f); GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(f); GUY. CONST.
pt. 2, tit. 1, art. 144(2)(f); JAM. CONST. ch. III, § 20(6)(e); KENYA CONST. ch. IV, pt. 3, § 77(2)(f;
KRmATI CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(f); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(e); MAURrIUS CONST. ch. II,
§ 10(2)(f); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(3)(d); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(6); NIa. CONST.
ch. IV, § 35(5)(e); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. m, div. 3(C), art. 37(4)(d); PERU CONST. tit. IV, ch.
IX, art. 233(15); ROM. CONST. tit. IfI, ch. VI, § I, art. 127(2); ST. CHRIST.-NEvis CONST. ch. II,
§ 10(2)(f); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. M, § 23(5)(e); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(f); SwAZ.
CONST. ch. I, § 10(2)(f); TRiN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. I, pt. I, § 5(2)(g); TUvALU CONST. pt. II,
div. 3(A), § 22(3)(g); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, § 15(2)(f); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, art. 20(2)(0;
ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, §-18(3)(f).
237. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. mI, art. 14(3)(d), at 54.
238. Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, § I, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
239. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(2)(e), at 4.
240. Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(c), at 60.
241. BOP, supra note 22, princ. 17(1), at 299.
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instruments is consistent with the application of the right to procedures
other than the actual trial.
The right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings is explicitly
granted in at least eleven national constitutions.242 It can be implied
as well in the ten constitutions which provide for the right to defense
at all stages of the proceedings. 3 The constitutions which guarantee
the right to counsel at the time of detention, as well as at trial,2'
come close to the protections guaranteed under this right.
8. The Right to a Speedy Trial The right to a speedy trial is
intended to limit infringements on personal freedom caused by pretrial
and trial detention. It is also crucial to the guarantee of a fair trial
because undue delays may cause the loss of evidence or the fading of
the memories of the witnesses. In addition, the right seeks to minimize
the emotional strain on the accused caused by pending criminal
proceedings.
The ICCPR, the Fundamental Freedoms, the AMCHR, and the
BOP all guarantee the right to release from detention if the accused
is not brought to trial within a reasonable time.245 All of these
instruments and the Banjul Charter guarantee the right to a trial within
a reasonable time regardless of the custodial status of the accused.24
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed in forty-three of the
national constitutions surveyed.247 As in the ICCPR, the Fundamen-
242. BULG. CONST. ch. 2, art. 30(4); GUAT. CONsr. tit. 11, ch. I, art. 19(c); HUNG. CONST. ch.
XII, § 57(3); ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 24; JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 37; LIBER. CONST. ch.
III, art. 21(i); MEx. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 20(IX); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(4); PERU
CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(20)(h); PORT. CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I, art. 32(3); ROM. CONST. ch. II,
art. 24(2).
243. See supra text accompanying note 154.
244. See supra text accompanying note 222.
245. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 9(3), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
I, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 38, at 300; AMCHR, supra note 22,
pt. I, ch. II, art. 7(5), at 5.
246. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 14(3)(c), at 54; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22,
§ 1, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; BOP, supra note 22, princ. 38, at 300; Banjul, supra note 22,
pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(d), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(1), at 4.
247. ANT. & BARB. CoNST. ch. II, § 5(6); BAH. CONST. ch. I, § 19(3); BANGL CONST. pt.
III, § 35(3); BARB. CONST. ch. III, §§ 13(3)(b), 18(1); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, §§ 5(5), 6(2); BOTS.
CONST. ch. II, §§ 5(3), 10(1); CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(b); DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, § 8(1); FUI
CONST. ch. II, §§ 6(5), 11(1); GAM. CONST. ch. III, §§ 15(5), 20(1); GREN. CONST. ch. I, §§ 3(5),
8(1); GUY. CONST. pt. 2, tit. 1, art. 144(1); JAM. CONST. ch. I, §§ 15(3), 20(1); JAPAN CONST.
ch. U1, art. 37; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 72(3), (5); KIREBATI CONST. ch. II, §§ 5(3), 10(1); KOREA
(REPUBLIC OF) CONST. art. 27(3); LIBER. CONST. arts. 21(f), (h); MALTA CONST. ch. I, §§ 34(3),
39(1); MAURrnUS CONST. ch. II, §§ 5(3), 10(1); MEx. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 20(VIII); NAMM.
CONST. ch. 3, arts. 11(3), 12(1)(b); NAURU CoNST. pt. I1, § 10(2); NETH. CONST. ch. I, art. 15(3);
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tal Freedoms, and the AMCHR, many constitutions contain language
relating to both the detention of an accused and the right to a speedy
trial in general. In some constitutions, the right is articulated only in
relation to detained persons.'u In such cases, the right to a speedy
trial may only guarantee release from detention and not necessarily an
expeditious resolution of the case. The right to a speedy trial,
however, is qualified by the threat of expedited proceedings which
jeopardize a fair trial. 9 The counterbalance to this right, then, is the
accused's right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
or her defense.' 5
This right varies in its application and in penalties for its violation.
It may apply to each or all stages of the proceedings (i.e., pretrial, trial,
post-trial, appeal). Specific time limits may be set for each stage or
multiple stages. Exceeding the required time limits may result in
dismissal of the charges or reversal of the conviction. In such cases,
some systems will hold that the same charge may be barred from
future adjudication, thus having a res judicata or jeopardy effect.
9. The Right to Appeal. To err is human; thus protection
against error is necessary. The right to appeal judicial rulings,
including a criminal conviction, to a higher court or tribunal fulfills this
need. What elements of the proceedings can be appealed, and how
that can be done varies throughout the legal systems. Some allow
reversal of the law, others of both the facts and the law. Some systems
allow interlocutory appeals of nonfinal judicial rulings. The review or
appeal process may be one- or two-tiered (i.e., an appellate court and
a supreme court). For example, Article 14 of the ICCPR requires the
right to at least one higher appellate level in criminal matters.251 An
NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 34(2); NIG. CONSr. ch. IV, §§ 34(4), 35(3); PAPUA N.G. CONST.
pt. I, div. 3, subdiv. B(37)(3); PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 17; PORT. CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I, art.
28(1), (4); ROM. CONST. tit. II, ch. II, art. 23(3); ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. II, §§ 5(5), 10(1);
SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, §§ 17 (3), 23(1); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. H, §§ 5(3), 10(1); SPAIN
CONST. tit. I, ch. II, § 1, arts. 17(2), 24(2); SUDAN CONST. pt. III, § 28; SwAZ. CONST. ch. II, §,§
5(3), 5(5), 10(1); SWED. CONST. ch. II, art. 9; TURK. CONST. pt. II, ch. II(I), art. 19, paras. 4, 6;
TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. 3, subdiv. A, §§ 17(5), 22(2); UGANDA CONST. ch. III, §§ 10(3), 15(1);
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, §§ 15(3), 20(1); ZImB. CONS?. ch. III, §§ 13(4),
18(2).
248. Se4 ag., NETH. CONST. ch. I, art. 15(3) ("The trial of a person who has been deprived
of his liberty pending trial shall take place within a reasonable period.").
249. See supra text accompanying notes 173-88 (discussing the right to have procedures
established by law).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 202-09 (concerning the right to equality of arms).
251. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I1, art. 14(5), at 54.
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appeal is considered a continuation of the criminal justice process and
as such implicates rights previously discussed, including the right to an
impartial and independent tribunal, procedures established by law,' 2
speedy trial, public hearing, equality of arms, and assistance of counsel.
However, constitutional guarantees to appeal do not always provide
for the same rights at appeal as are available at the trial. One of the
rights necessary for an effective right of appeal by indigents is the right
to obtain a free transcript, but in practice this right is seldom recog-
nized.
The right to appeal is guaranteed in four of the instruments
surveyed 53 As contemplated in these instruments, the right does
not encompass a de novo review of the facts of a case with a reevalua-
tion of the evidence. Instead, the appellate court or tribunal'
serves as a forum to challenge violations of any of the rights discussed
in this Article which have adversely impacted the fairness of the
verdict or instances where violations of domestic law may have
rendered the judgment flawed.
At least forty-five national constitutions contain guarantees which
are tantamount to a right to appeal a criminal conviction to a higher
court. 5 In many of these documents the guarantee refers to "consti-
252. The ICCPR specifies that the appeal must be "according to law." Id. The Fundamental
Freedoms indicates that an appeal "shall be governed by law." Protocol No. 7 to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1984, art. 2(1), 24 I.L.M. 435, 435 [hereinafter Protocol No. 7].
253. Protocol No. 7, supra note 252, art. 2(1), at 435; ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 14(5),
at 54; Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(1)(a), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II,
art. 8(2)(h), at 4.
254. The ICCPR and the Fundamental Freedoms guarantee the right of appeal to a "higher
tribunal." Protocol No. 7, supra note 252, art. 2(1), at 435; ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art.
14(5), at 54. The AMCHR uses the term "higher court." AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II,
art. 8(2)(h), at 4. The Banjul Charter guarantees a "right to an appeal to competent national
organs against acts ... violating. .. fundamental ights.... ." Banjul, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I,
art. 7(1)(a), at 60.
255. ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. IX, §§ 121(a), 122(1); BAH. CONST. ch. VII, pt. 3, § 104(1);
BARB. CONST. ch. VII, § 87; BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 20(4); BoTS. CONST. ch. VI, pt. IV, § 106;
DOMrNICA CONST. ch. VII, § 105(1)(a); FLT CONST. ch. VII, pt. 4, §§ 115, 117; GAM. CONST. ch.
VII, pt. III, § 95(1); GREN. CONsT. ch. VII, §§ 103,104(c); GUAT. CONST. tit. IV, ch. II, arts. 265,
266; GuY. CONST. pt. I, ch. IX, § 133(a), (b); HOND. CONST. tit. IV, ch. II, arts. 183, 185; HUNG.
CONST. ch. XII, § 57(5); INDIA CONST. pt. V, § 134(1); ITALY CoNST. tit. IV, § II, art. 111; JAM.
CONST. ch. VII, pt. 3, § 110(1)(c); LIBE. CONST. arts. 20(b), 26; LIECH. CONST. art. 43; MALAWI
CONST. arts. 68,69; MALDIvES CONST. § 18; MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 46 (4); MAuRmus CONST.
ch. VII, §§ 81(1), 82(2); MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 107(VII), (XII); MYANMAR CONST. ch.
VII, art. 101(g); NAMm. CONST. ch. 9, art. 80(2); NAURU CONST. pt. V, § 57; NEPAL CONST. pt.
II, § 88(3); NICAR. CONST. chap. V, art. 164(2); NIG. CONST. ch. VII, pt. I, §§ 239(1), 231(2);
PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. I, div. 3, subdiv. B, § 37(15), (16); PORT. CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I, art.
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tutional violations" in criminal proceedings and often includes recourse
to more than one appellate tribunal, particularly where the judicial
systems bifurcate the adjudication of questions of law and constitution-
ality, with the latter being handled exclusively in specialized constitu-
tional courts. Many legal systems provide special remedies for
appellate review, such as habeas corpus in the common law system and
amparo (the counterpart of habeas corpus) in Latin American
countries.
10. The Right to be Protected from Double Jeopardy. This right
is designed to prevent the state from repeatedly subjecting a person to
prosecution for offenses arising out of the same event until the desired
results are achieved. It derives from a sense of fairness, and can be
analogized to the civil law concept of res judicata. The noncommon
law countries refer to it as non bis in idem.
The concept of double jeopardy is interpreted differently by
different world legal systems. In some states an acquittal on the facts
is final and gives rise to double jeopardy. 6  In most continental
European nations, however, the state may appeal an acquittal due to
errors of law or questions of fact. A 'conviction may be reversed on
appeal and a new trial ordered, or the judgment may be revised
without remand for a new trial. Double jeopardy and non bis in idem
vary as to their scope and application. Double jeopardy is usually held
to apply within a given legal system and not as between different legal
systems or separate sovereignties. 27 Non bis in idem is a right that
protects the person from repeated prosecution or punishment for the
same conduct, irrespective of the prosecuting system. Note, however,
29(6); ST. CHRaS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. IX, §§ 98(a), 99(1); SmRRA LEONE CONST. ch. VII, pt. II,
§§ 122(1), 123(1), (6); id. ch. VII, pt. Im, § 129(1); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. VII, pt. 11(a), § 83;
SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. I, § 1, art. 17(4); SRI LANKA CONST. ch. XVI, § 128 (1); SUDAN CONST.
pt. III, § 32(1); SURIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 10; SWAZ. CONST. ch. IX, pt. I, § 104(1)(b); TONGA
CONsT. pt. II, § 91(1); TRN. & TOBAGO CONST. ch. VII, pt. I, § 108; id. at ch. VII, pt. II, § 109;
TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. 5, §§ 38, 41; id. at pt. VII, div. 4, § 136; UGANDA CONST. ch. III, §
22; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. I, § 29; ZImB. CONST. ch. II, § 24.
256. The Fifth Amendment guarantee, enforceable against states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or
conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense. See U.S. CONST. amends. V,
XIV, §1; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying the double jeopardy clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
257. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (double jeopardy clause of
the Fifth Amendment prohibits successive prosecutions for the same criminal act under two
criminal statutes whenever each statute does not "requir[e] proof of a fact which the other does
not.").
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that non bis in idem under the Fundamental Freedoms applies as
between the member states. Furthermore, legal systems differ as to
when jeopardy attaches. Constitutional and treaty provisions do not
go into such specificity. It should be noted that some approaches to
double jeopardy are limited to the nonapplicability of double
punishment, but do not exclude repeated prosecution.
Protection from double jeopardy and non bis in idem are found
in four of the surveyed instruments."8 The ICCPR and the Funda-
mental Freedoms prohibit retrials of both acquittals and convictions,
as well as double punishment, but make allowances for differences in
domestic legal systems?59 The Fundamental Freedoms also includes
a specific exception: "if there is evidence of new or newly discovered
facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous
proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case."'  The
AMCHR guarantees protection against double jeopardy without
qualification, but only after an acquittal."' The right to protection
from double jeopardy and non bis in idem are found in over fifty
national constitutions. 2
258. Protocol No. 7, supra note 252, art. 4(1), at 436; ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. mI, art. 14(7),
at 55; SMRTP, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 30(1), at 69; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. 11, art.
8(4), at 4; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
259. Both the ICCPR and the Fundamental Freedoms specify "in accordance with the law
and penal procedure . .." of each country. Protocol No. 7, supra note 252, art. 4(1), at 436;
ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 14(7), at 55.
260. Protocol No. 7, supra note 252, art. 4(2), at 436.
261. AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 8(4), at 4.
262. ANT. & BARB. ch. H, § 15(5); BAH. CONS. ch. III, § 20(5); BANGL CONST. pt. m, §
35(2); BARB. CONsT. ch. I, § 18(5); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(5); BOiS. CONST. ch. II, § 10(5);
CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 11(h); COSTA RICA CONsT. tit. IV, art. 42; DOMINIcA CONST. ch. I, § 8(5);
DOM. REP. CONST. tit. II, § I, art 8(2)(h); EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. ]I, art. 20(19); Fui CONST.
pt. 1, ch. 2, § 11(5); GAM. CONS. ch. HI, § 20(5); F.R.G. CONST. tit. IX, art. 103(3); GREN.
CONS?. ch. I, § 8(5); Guy. CONST. pt. II, tit. I, § 144(5); HOND. CONST. tit. HI, ch. II, art. 95;
INDIA CONST. pt. MI, §20(2); JAM. CONST. ch. HI, § 20(8); JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 39; KENYA
CONST. ch. V, § 77(5); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, § 10(5); KOREA (REPUBLIC OF) CONS". ch. 11,
art. 13(1); LIBER. CONST. ch. III, art. 21(h); MADAG. CONST. tit. II, art. 42; MALAY. CONST. pt.
II, § 7(2); MALTA CONST. ch. IV, §39(9); MAURrlUS CONST. ch. II, § 10(5); MEX. CONST. tit. I,
ch. I, art. 23; NAMIB. CONST. ch. 3, art. 12(2); NAURU CONST. pt. H, § 10(5); NEPAL CONST. pt.
H, § 14(2); NICAR. CONST. fit. IV, art. 34(9); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 35(8); PAK. CONST. pt. II,
ch. I, § 13(a); PAPUA N. G. CONST. pt. HIL, div. 3, subdiv. B, § 37(8); PARA. CONST. ch. V., art.
64; PERU CONST. ch. IX, art. 233(11); PIL. CONST. art. IV(22); PORT. CONST. pt. I, § II, ch. I,
art. 29(5); ST. CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. H1, § 10(5); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 23(9); SING.
CONST. pt. IV, § 11(2); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. I1, § 10(5); SWAZ. CONST. ch. II, § 10(5); TONGA
CONST. pt. I, cls. 12, 22(8); UGANDA CONST. ch. I, § 15(5); U.S. CONST. amend. V; VENEZ.
CONST. tit. II, ch. I, § 60(8); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. In, § 20(5); ZIMB. CONST. ch. I, § 18(6).
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11. The Right to be Protected From Ex Post Facto Laws.
Protection from ex post facto laws is one of the fundamental principles
of legality, which also include nulla poena sine lege and nullum crimen
sine lege.26 This right guarantees that crimes and punishments will
not be created ad hoc to apply retroactively to particular cases or
persons. The basis of this fundamental right is that it provides people
with prospective notice of a criminal violation and avoids the arbitrary
criminalization of conduct after the fact, which would allow those in
power to convict and punish at will anyone so targeted. It is,
therefore, not only a fairness right but also a fundamental right against
unbridled abuse of power. An extension of this prohibition in certain
legal systems is the prohibition of interpreting criminal laws by
analogy."
The right was guaranteed as early as the American Constitution
of 17876 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of
1789; it is now included in five of the instruments surveyed.267
These instruments prohibit the conviction of any person "on account
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense...
at the time it was committed,"' and proscribe the imposition of
punishments in excess of those prescribed by law at the time of the
commission of the offense. The Universal Declaration, the ICCPR,
the Fundamental Freedoms, and the AMCHR allow conviction and
punishment for acts or omissions which constituted crimes under
national or international law at the time of commission.269 If after
263. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 27, 35 (1960). Nulla
poena sine lege means no punishment without a law. Nulla crimen sine lege means no crime
without a law.
264. For a comparative study of principles of legality, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 5. In the
Soviet Union prior to 1958 judges could find a person guilty by analogy, even though the
particular conduct before the court did not constitute a crime at the time of its commission. See
HAROLD J. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 22 (Harold
J. Berman & James W. Spindler trans., 2d ed. 1972); see also THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
OF THE USSR, supra note 188.
265. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
266. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN, supra note 109, para.
8, at 744-45.
267. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 15(1), at 55; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 7(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 11(2), at 73; Banjul,
supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art. 7(2), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 9, at 4.
268. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. II, art. 15(1), at 55; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 22, §
1, art. 7(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 11(2), at 73; Banjul,
supra note 22, pt. I, ch. I, art 7(2), at 60; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. H1, art. 9, at 4.
269. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 15(1), (2), at 55; Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
22, § 1, art. 7(1), (2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228-29; Universal Declaration, supra note 4, art. 11(2), at
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the commission of an offense, the law is changed to provide for lighter
sentences for the proscribed conduct, both the ICCPR and the
AMCHR allow the charged or convicted person to benefit from the
change.270
The right to be protected from ex post facto laws is guaranteed in
at least ninety-six national constitutions."' Many of these constitu-
tions also specify that the prohibition against retroactivity does not
apply to laws which benefit the accused or convicted personYm
73; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art. 9, at 4.
270. ICCPR, supra note 4, pt. I, art. 15(1), at 55; AMCHR, supra note 22, pt. I, ch. II, art.
9, at 4.
271. ALB. CONST. pt. I, ch. II, art. 56; ALG. CONST. tit. I, ch. 4, art. 43; ANT. & BARB.
CONST. ch. II, § 15(4); ARG. CONST. pt. I, art. 18; BA. CONST. ch. III, § 20(4); BANGL. CONST.
pt. III, § 35(1); BARB. CONS. ch. m1, §18(4); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(4); BOTs. CONST. ch. II,
§ 10(4); BRAZ. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5(XXXIX), (XL); BULG. CONsT. ch. X, art. 5(3); CAN.
CONST. pt. I, § 11(g); CAPE VERDE CONST. tit. II, art. 32; CILE CONST. ch. III, art. 19(3);
COLOM. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, arts. 28, 29; COMOROS CONST. tit. VI, art. 43; CONGO CONST. tit.
II, art. 7; COSTA RICA CONS. tit IV, arts. 34, 39; CUBA CONST. ch. VI, art. 58; DOMINICA
CONST. ch. I, § 8(4); DOM. REP. CONST. tit. IV, § VI, art. 47; ECUADOR CONST. pt. I, tit. I1, § I,
art. 19(17)(c); EGYPT CONST. pt. IV, art. 66; EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. III, ch. I, art. 20(21); ETH.
CONST. pt. I, ch. 7, art. 45(2); Fi CONST. pt. 1, ch. 2, § 11(4); F.R.G. CONST. tit. IX, art. 103(2);
GAM. CONST. ch. I, § 20(4); GREECE CONST. pt. II, art. 7(1); GREN. CONT. ch. I, § 8(4); GUAT.
CoNST. tit. II, ch. I, arts. 15,17; GUY. CONST. pt. 2, tit. I, § 144(4); HOND. CONST. tit. III, ch. II,
arts. 95, 96; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, § 57(4); INDIA CONST. pt. M, § 20(1); IRAQ CONST. ch. III,
art. 21(b); ITALY CONST. pt. I, tit. I, art. 25; JAM. CONST. ch. I, § 20(7); JAPAN CONST. ch. II,
art. 39; KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(4); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, § 10(4); KOREA CONsT. ch. II, art.
13(1); KUWAIT CONST. pt. I, art. 32; LIER. CONST. ch. III, art. 21(a); MADAG. CONST. tit. II,
art. 42; MALAY. CONST. pt. II, § 7(1); MALI CONST. tit. II, art. 8; MALTA CONST. ch. IV, § 39(8);
MAURrrIUs CONST. ch. II, § 10(4); MFX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 14; MOROCCO CONST. art. 4;
MYANMAR CONST. ch. m, art. 23; NAMIB. CONST. ch. 3, art. 12(3); NAURU CONST. pt. II, § 10(4);
NEPAL CONST. pt. 3, § 14(1); NETH. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, arts.
35(10), 38; NIGER CONST. tit. XII, art. 82; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 35(7); NOR. CONST. art. 97; PAK.
CONST. pt. II, § 12(1); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. I, div. 3, subdiv. B, § 37(7); PARA. CONST. ch.
V, tit. I, arts. 61, 67; PERU CONST. ch. III, art. 20(d); PHIH CONS?. art. IV, § 12; PORT. CONST.
pt. I, § 2, ch. I, art. 29(1); QATAR CONS. pt. I, art. 10; RoM. CONST. ch. II, art. 23(9); ST.
CHRIS.-NEVIS CONST. ch. H, § 10(4); SAO TOMA & PRINCIPE CONS. ch. H, art. 15; SEN. CONST.
tit. II, art. 6; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 23(7); SING. CONS. pt. IV, § 11(1); SOLOM. Is.
CONST. ch. H, § 10(4); SOMAL. CONST. ch. 2, art. 34; SPAIN CONST. tit. I, ch. II, § 1, art. 25(1);
SRI LANKA CONST. ch. I, § 13(6); SUDAN CONST. pt. I, § 27; SURIN. CONST. ch. XV, § 1, art.
131(2); SWAz. CONST. ch. II, § 10(4); SWED. CONST. ch. II, art. 10; SYRIA CONST. pt. 4, art. 30;
TANz. CONS. § 13(6)(c); THAIL. CONST. ch. I, § 26; TONGA CONST. pt. 1, d. 20; TUNIS. CONST.
ch. I, art. 13; TURK. CONST. ch. II, art. 38(1); TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. 3, § 22(6); UGANDA
CONST. ch. M, § 15(4); U.A.E. CONST. pt. 3, art. 27; U.S. CONS?. art. I, § 9; VENEZ. CONST. tit.
I, ch. I, art. 44; YEMEN CONST. tit. II, art. 31; ZAIRE CONST. tit. II, art. 15; ZAMBIA CONST. pt.
m, § 20(4); ZIM. CONST. ch. I, § 18(5).
272. See, eg., ETH. CONST. pt. H, ch. 7, art. 45(2); MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 14; NICAR.
CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, arts. 34(10), 38; PARA. CONST. ch. V, arts. 61, 67.
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B. A Summation of Rights
,This study has investigated 139 constitutions which enumerate
some' protections of human rights and procedural safeguards for
persons in the criminal justice process. However, many constitutions
predate the human rights instruments surveyed, although that does not
necessarily reduce the depth and breadth of the protections and
guarantees included therein. It is important to note that post-1946
constitutions contain terminology substantially similar to that found in
contemporary human rights instruments. Indeed, at times there seems
to be an uncanny resemblance between the terminology of more recent
constitutions and that of the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR.
The migration of ideas, coupled with commonly shared values,
necessarily leads to similarity of terms.
The analysis of these 139 constitutions has revealed an over-
whelming affirmation of such core rights as the right to life, liberty,
and security of the person (fifty-one countries), the right to recognition
before the law and equal protection of the laws (108 countries), the
right to be free from arbitrary detentions (119 countries), the right to
be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment (eighty-one countries), the right to be presumed
innocent (sixty-seven countries), the right to a fair trial (thirty-eight
countries), the right to assistance of counsel (sixty-five countries), the
right to a speedy trial (forty-three countries), the right to an appeal
(forty-six countries), the right to be protected from double jeopardy
(fifty-one countries), and the protection against ex post facto laws
(ninety-six countries). If the right to a fair trial (thirty-nine countries)
is considered in conjunction with the right to a defense (forty-five
countries), there exists an strong affirmation of the right to general
fairness in criminal proceedings.
The relatively high number of constitutions which guarantee the
right to notice (fifty-one), to counsel of choice (forty-seven), to a
speedy trial (forty-seven), to appeal (fifty-nine), and to protection
against double jeopardy (fifty-nine) also indicates that there is broad
international acceptance of these more concrete aspects of the right to
a fair trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The human rights guarantees investigated in this Article were
derived by the concordance of protected rights in national constitutions
and international instruments, which is a valid method of demonstrat-
ing the existence of "general principles of law" in international law.
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National laws and codes of criminal procedure, as well as court
decisions, further expand upon these rights. There are, however,
divergences between the enunciation of principles and their applica-
tion. Nonetheless, the principle purpose of this Article is to establish
the existence of certain general principles of human rights protection
for persons in national criminal justice processes. Human rights
activists should not shrink from asserting fundamental human rights
protection as "general principles of law," and should carry out further
inductive investigations of national law to strengthen the validity of
this contention.
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APPENDIX I: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
SURVEYED
1. 'Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc AIRES/39/46 (1984) (referred to as Conven-
tion Against Torture).
2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(referred to as Convention on Racial Discrimination).
3. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc
A/6316 (1966) (referred to as ICCPR).
4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (and accompanying Protocols), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (referred to as Fundamental Freedoms).
5. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR,
43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 297, U.N. Doe. A/43/173 (1988) (referred
to as BOP).
6. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) (referred to as
Universal Declaration).
7. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners at 67, U.N. Doe. A/CONF/6/1, Annex I, A, U.N. Sales No.
1956.IV.4 (1956) (referred to as SMRTP).
8. European Convention on the Protection of Detainees from Torture
and from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
signed Nov. 26, 1987, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152 (referred to as
European Convention on Protection of Detainees).
9. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27,
1981, O.A.U. Doe. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981) reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
58 (1982) (referred to as Banjul).
10. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.
Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. A/16 (referred
to as AMCHR).
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APPENDIX II: RIGHTS SURVEYED
1. The right to life, liberty, and security of the person
2. The right to recognition before the law and equal protection of
the law
3. The right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention
4. The right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment or punishment
5. The right to be presumed innocent
6. The right to a fair trial
a. The right to the inadmissibility of certain evidence
b. The right to an impartial and independent tribunal
c. The right to have procedures established by law
d. The right to a speedy trial
e. The right to a public hearing
f. The right to be informed of the charges
g. The right to equality of arms
h. The right to assistance of counsel
i. The right to compulsory process
j. The right to be tried in one's own presence
7. The right to assistance of counsel
a. The right to counsel of one's own choice
b. The righ to appointment of counsel in case of indigency
C. The right to self-representation
d. The right to assistance of an interpreter
e. The right to the presence of counsel at all stages of the
proceedings
8. The right to a speedy trial
9. The right to appeal
10. The right to be protected from double jeopardy
11. The right to be protected from ex post facto laws
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APPENDIX III: CONSTITUTIONS SURVEYED 2 3
Afghanistan (1990), Albania (1976), Algeria (1986), Angola (1981),
Antigua and Barbuda+ (1981), Argentina (1853), Australia (1986),
Austria (1929), Bahamas (1973), Bahrain (*), Bangladesh (1972),
Barbados (1966), Belgium (1831), Belize (1981), Benin (1977), Bolivia+
(1967), Botswana (1966), Brazil (1988), Bulgaria (1991), Cambodia
(1989), Cameroon (1961), Canada (1867), Cape Verde (1982), Central
African Republic (1986), Chad (1982), Chile (1980), People's Republic
of China (1982), Colombia (1886), Comores (1978), Congo (1979),
Costa Rica (1949), C6te d'Ivoire (1960), Cuba (1976), Cyprus (1960),
Denmark (1953), Djibouti (1977), Dominica (1978), Dominican
Republic (1966), Ecuador (1978), Egypt (1980), Equatorial Guinea
(1973), Ethiopia (1987), Fiji (1990), Finland (1919), France (1958),
Gabon (1975), Gambia (1970), Germany (1949), Greece+ (1975),
Grenada (1973), Guatemala (1985), Guinea (1958), Guyana (1980),
Honduras (1982), Hungary (1949), Iceland (1944), India (1989),
Indonesia (1945), Iraq (1970), Ireland (1937), Italy (1947), Jamaica
(1962), Japan (1946), Jordan (1952), Kenya (1962), Kiribati (1979),
Korea (Democratic Peopl's Republic of) (1972), Korea (Republic of)
(1987), Kuwait (1962), Liberia (1984), Libya+ (1969), Liechtenstein
(1921), Luxembourg (1868), Madagascar (1975), Malawi (1966),
Malaysia (1957), Maldives (1968), Mali (1974), Malta (1964), Mauritius
(1968), Mexico (1917), Monaco (1962), Mongolia+ (*), Morocco+
(1992); Mozambique (1975), Myanmar (1974), Namibia (1990), Nauru
(1968), Nepal (1962), Netherlands (1987), Nicaragua (1987), Niger
(1989), Nigeria (1989), Norway+ (1814), Pakistan (1973), Panama (*),
Papua-New Guinea (1984), Paraguay (1967), Peru (1979), Philippines
(1973), Poland (*), Portugal (1989), Qatar (1970), Romania (1991),
Rwanda (1978), St. Christopher-Nevis (1983), Sao Tom6 and Principe
(1975), Senegal (1963), Seychelles (1979), Sierra Leone (1991),
Singapore (1963), Solomon Islands (1978), Somalia (1979), Spain
(1978), Sri Lanka (1972), Sudan (1985), Suriname (1982), Swaziland
(1968), Sweden (1976), Switzerland (1874), Syria (1973), Taiwan
273. The research for this study was based on the texts of the constitutions as found in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIEs OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
eds., 1991). Constitutions which were not included in this edition of CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
WORLD were obtained separately from embassies; they are marked with a +. The dates shown
reflect the first version of the constitution; dates for subsequent amendments are not included.
Constitutions which are not dated are marked with a *. The constitutions of some countries have
been suspended because of civil unrest, and others are effectively inaccessible outside of that
country, e.g., El Salvador, Haiti, Iran.
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(1946), Tanzania (1977), Thailand (1978), Togo (*), Tonga (1967),
Trinidad and Tobago (1976), Tunisia (1957), Turkey (1982), Tuvalu
(1986), Uganda (1985), United Arab Emirates+ (1971), United SIates
(1789), Venezuela (1973), Vietnam (1980), Yemen (1980), 'Zaire
(1990), Zambia (1973), Zimbabwe (1979). 1-

